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I. INTRODUCTION

This article surveys significant developments in the area of criminal
procedure between June 1, 1996, and June 1, 1997. The primary focus of
this branch of criminal procedure is on the interpretation of the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments, more specifically cases involving the substantive
areas of search and seizure and confessions. To do so effectively, the
authors have selected notable cases from the United States Supreme Court,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the various Florida courts. This
article seeks to clarify established principles, indicate continuing trends, and
signify a new emphasis or direction without discussing the application of
settled or fairly standard fact situations. The author's purpose is to provide
the reader with insight into recent changes on the federal and state level, and
the case law's general legal impact on criminal practitioners and citizens in
the State of Florida.
II. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

A.

PretextualPolice Conduct

Between June 1, 1996, and June 1, 1997, the United States Supreme
Court issued a number of significant decisions involving investigatory and
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pretextual traffic stops. Arguably, the most controversial decision of the
survey period was Whren v. United States, which addressed the Fourth
Amendment's concern of "reasonableness" when law enforcement officials
conduct traffic stops. 2 In Whren, the Court held that the temporary detention
of a motorist is reasonable where an officer has probable cause to believe a
motorist has violated a traffic law, even if a reasonable police officer would
not have detained the driver for such a violation.3 The facts of Whren
involve police officers who stopped petitioner Brown's vehicle in a "high
drug area" after Brown was driving at an "unreasonable" speed and failed to
properly signal. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officers observed the
passenger, petitioner Whren, handling plastic bags of what appeared to be
crack cocaine. Petitioners were arrested, and quantities of several types of
illegal drugs were retrieved.4 Prior to trial on federal drug charges,
petitioners moved to suppress the evidence alleging the stop was pretextual
and was not justified by either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
believe the men were engaged in illegal activity. The motion to suppress
was denied and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed.5
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Whren, dismissed the
petitioner's argument that a subjective "reasonable officer" standard should
have been used based upon the Supreme Court's previous disapproval of
police attempts to use valid bases of action against citizens for other
investigative purposes. 6 Generally, the decision to stop an automobile is
reasonable if probable cause exists that there has been a traffic violation,
reiteratinP the traditional common law rule justifying search and
seizures. More significantly, the Supreme Court rejected any inquiries into
the subjective state of mind of the individual police officer, stating that
"[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis[,]" foreclosing any argument that the ulterior motives

1. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).

2. Id. at 1772.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773 (citing Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)). In Wells,
the Court stated that "an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order
to discover incriminating evidence." Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.
367, 372 (1987) (approving an inventory search where there had been no evidence of
improper police procedure or bad faith). An inventory search is the search of property
lawfully seized and detained in order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable items
(such as might be kept in a towed car), and to protect against false claims of loss or damage.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976).
7. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1769.
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conduct. 8 Furthermore, the Supreme Court refused to apply a detailed

balancing analysis 9 by stating such inquiries are necessary only in cases
involving searches or seizures conducted in a manner unusually harmful to
the individual.' 0 Accordingly, although a routine traffic stop by plain clothes
officers based on probable cause may generate "concern" or "fright," the
existence of probable cause to believe that a law has been broken outweighs
the private interest in avoiding police conduct." Historically, the standard in
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for determining if a traffic stop was
"pretextual" has been whether "a reasonable officer would have made the
seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation."' 12 Nevertheless, the
Eleventh Circuit appears to have embraced Whren, thereby strengthening
pretextual police conduct without reducing the incentive of officers who act
upon ulterior motives to investigate into other matters.
In United States v. Holloman,13 the court found that the seizure of
Holloman's vehicle after a traffic stop comported with the Fourth
Amendment notwithstanding the officer's subjective desire to intercept
narocotics.'
Holloman refused to have his truck searched after police
officers, working with a drug interdiction unit, stopped his vehicle for failing
to have an illuminated license tag. 5 However, using a canine who alerted

8. Id. at 1774.
9. Petitioners argued that a balancing test should be used to weigh the governmental and
individual interests implicated in a traffic stop. Petitioners claim such balancing does not
permit investigation of traffic violations by plain clothes officers in unmarked cars since it
minimally advances the government's interest in traffic safety and unduly burdens the motorist
by creating "substantial anxiety." Id. at 1776. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657
(1979). The Court in Whren distinguished itself from Prouse and the use of a balancing
analysis because the latter was based on a random traffic stop to check a motorist's license and
vehicle registration, a claim that involved police intrusion without the probable cause that is
its traditional justification. Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1776.
10. Id. at 1776. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 1, 934 (1995) (unannounced entry
into a home); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (seizure by means of deadly force);
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985) (physical penetration of the body); Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984).
11. Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1777.
12. See United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11 th Cir. 1986).
13. 113 F.3d 192 (1
lth Cir. 1997).
14. Id. at 196. See Riley v. Alabama, 104 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 1997) (stopping
of vehicle was justified where automobile was traveling over 60 miles an hour in a residential
neighborhood, and passenger was throwing paraphernalia out of the window).
15. Holloman, 113 F.3d at 193. Section 316.221(2) of the FloridaStatutes "requires a
tail lamp or separate lamp to illuminate the rear registration plate and render it clearly legible
from a distance of 50 feet to the rear." Id. at 193 n.1 (citing FLA. STAT. § 316.221(2) (1996)).
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the presence of narcotics on the passenger side of the vehicle, officers
discovered 694 grams of crack cocaine. Neither the nature of the minor
traffic infraction nor the use of a canine to establish probable cause were
viewed by the Eleventh Circuit as significant differentiating elements. 16 The
court in Holloman also concluded that the facts were identically
indistinguishable from the Supreme Court's decision in Whren. 17 In both
cases, the police officers had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had
occurred, conducted constitutionally valid seizures of the narcotics of each
petitioner, and were appropriately decided by their respective courts who did
not analyze the officer's subjective motivation to conduct the traffic stop. 18
The Whren decision will likely have a significant impact on pretextual
stops in the State of Florida. In State v. Holland,19 the First District Court of
Appeal noted that the Whren Court unequivocally rejected the reasonable
officer test set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
Daniel. Consequently, the First District Court of Appeal certified a
question to the Supreme Court of Florida to determine the actual scope of
Whren.2 1 The Holland court, applying the reasonable officer test, held that

16. Holloman, 113 F.3d at 194.
17. Id. See United States v. Griffin, 109 F.3d 706 (11th Cir. 1997). Defendants were
pulled over for driving 65 miles an hour on the interstate. Id. at 707. After the stop for the
traffic violation, the officers conducted a canine sniff of the vehicle and found marijuana on
the front seat. Id. Although the arresting officer testified that the speed defendants were
traveling was not unreasonable, the court followed Whren by finding probable cause based
upon the traffic violation. Id. at 707-08.
18. Holloman, 113 F.3d at 194. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772
(1996).
19. 680 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996), rev. granted, 689 So. 2d 1069 (Fla.
1997).
20. Id. at 1042 (rejecting State v. Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040, 1046 (Fla. 1995)). The
Supreme Court of Florida held that "a stop is permissible if effected by specialized officers
properly acting within the scope of their usual duties and practices." Daniel, 665 So. 2d at
1046. The Daniel court expressly rejected both the so-called "'subjective test,' which
'attempts to inquire into the actual subjective reasons why the officer made the stop,"' and the
"objective test," now adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Whren. Holland, 680
So. 2d at 1045 (quoting State v. Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 1995)). Daniel
described the objective approach as a "'could arrest approach,"' dismissing such an
examination because the test "'would authorize stops for the subject infractions, however
unrelated those infractions may be to the true motive for the stop."' Id. (quoting State v.
Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Fla. 1995)).
21. The question, as originally certified asked:
WHETHER WHREN V. UNITED STATES, -- U.S. ---, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135
L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996), OVERRULES STATE V. DANIEL, 665 So. 2d 1040,
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detaining the appellant driver for questioning on drug charges after being
stopped for traveling seventy miles an hour was permissible.2 2 Judge Van
Nortwick, in his reluctant concurrence, recognized the flaws with a purely
objective test later adopted by Whren, specifically its inherent failure to
address the problems that sometimes will arise with specialized
officers.2 3 For this reason, the trial court found a lack of credible evidence to
support a finding that narcotics officers would, under their usual practice,
make a traffic stop absent an invalid motive.2 4 In this particular case, they
did not even issue a traffic citation after the stop. One judge stated: "Well, I
think that's all a fraud.., they sit here and testify-they got smirks on their
faces when they are testifying.... They know what they are doing. You
know what they are doing. I know what they are doing .... ,,25
Courts in a number of jurisdictions have attempted to find a solution to
the problem of pretextual traffic stops without focusing upon the subjective,
ulterior motivations of police officers. One attempt to limit the authority of
officers to order passengers out of a lawfully stopped vehicle was reversed
by the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Wilson.2 7 In Wilson, the
Supreme Court held that "an officer making a traffic stop may order
passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop. ''28 A
Maryland state tropper stopped the speeding car in which appellant Wilson
was a passenger. Upon noticing his apparent nervousness, the officer
ordered Wilson out of the car. When Wilson exited the vehicle, a quantity 29of
cocaine fell to the ground and he was arrested for possession of cocaine.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision,
holding that the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 30 that an officer may order
the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle, does not apply for
passengers. 31
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a police officer making a
traffic stop may require passengers to get out of the car pending a

1046 (Fla. 1995), AND WHETHER THE PRESENT SUPPRESSION
ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED.
Holland,680 So. 2d at 1044.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1045 (Van Nortwick, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 1046.
25. Holland, 680 So. 2d at 1046.
26. Gary T. Kedler, Criminal Procedure,47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 465, 472 (1997).
27. 117 S. Ct. 882, 886 (1997).
28. Id. at 886.
29. Id.
30. 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977).
31. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 883.
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completion of the stop. 32 Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the decision,
explained the Court's decision in Mimms which stated that the "touchstone
of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness
in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's
personal security."' '33 Using the statistical figures of the danger of traffic
34
stops for police officers, particularly when there is more than one occupant
the additional intrusion on a passenger already in a stopped vehicle is
minimal. 35 The result of the ensuing balancing test, between the public
interest in protecting law enforcement officers and an individual's rights
against intrusion, signifies a more expansive role for police officers during
traffic stops and sets a precedent that, at the very least as common motorists,
may further erode personal civil liberties.
B.

ConstitutionalityofRoadblocks

The legality of roadblocks once again posed significant dilemmas for
law enforcement officials in the State of Florida. The general standard
requires a written set of guidelines to be issued before a roadblock can be set
up. 6 Because roadblocks involve seizures without any articulable suspicion
of illegal activity, they should be based on the following considerations:
"(1) specific evidence of an existing violation; (2) a showing that reasonable
legislative or administrative inspection standards are met; or (3) a showing
that officers carry out the search pursuant to a plan embodying specific
neutral criteria which limit the conduct of the individual officers."
In Campbellv. State,38 a decisive statement was made requiring detailed
written guidelines issued to officers that set forth governing procedures for
individual roadblocks. 39 The Supreme Court of Florida noted that "[t]he

32. Id.
33. Id. at 884-85 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977))

(citation omitted).
34. Justice Stevens points out that "these statistics are not further broken down as to
assaults by passengers and assaults by drivers." Id. at 885 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 886.
36. See State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986).
37. Id. at 438.
38. 679 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 1996). The undisputed facts are that during the roadblock,
petitioner Campbell was stopped and transported to county jail for driving with a suspended

license. Officers searched Campbell and found powder cocaine and marijuana in his sock.
"Campbell moved to suppress the contraband seized from him and contended that the police
roadblock constituted an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 1169-70.
39. Id. at 1172.
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requirement of written guidelines is not merely a formality.... [but rather a
method] to ensure that the police do not act with unbridled discretion in
exercising the power to stop and restrain citizens. 40 In Campbell, a
roadblock to check motorists for traffic and safety violations was set up by
the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office in response to residents' complaints about
speeding and an accident that had occurred the previous weekend.4 1 Officers
prepared a written deployment strategy to stop motorists for a traffic safety
check on Mandarin Road and gave oral instructions to the other law
enforcement participants regarding procedural issues for the roadblock.
Nevertheless, the limited written instructions were deemed insufficient since
the operational order failed to contain guidelines
42 restricting the discretion of
the officers who took part in the road block. The Supreme Court of Florida
has made it emphatically clear that substituting general operating procedure
contained in a standard operational order will not replace
the requirement of
43
detailed written guidelines for individual roadblocks.
C.

Consent to Search

An attempt to limit what police may do after a stop by scrutinizing
when an officer has consent to search was rebuffed by the United States
Supreme Court.44 The Supreme Court categorically rejected the bright line
prerequisite for consensual interrogation requiring that an officer clearly
state when a citizen validly detained for a traffic offense is "legally free to
go. ' 45 Officer Newsome stopped petitioner Robinette for speeding. Neither
at the time of the stop nor prior to the search of Robinette's vehicle did the

40. Id. The purpose of written guidelines is to ensure that police officers do not
exercise their "power to stop and restrain citizens who have manifested no conduct that would
otherwise justify an intrusion on a citizen's civil liberty." Id. at 1172. The law is clear that
police do not have the authority to set up "routine" roadblocks at any time or place.
Campbell, 679 So. 2d at 1172. Therefore, stopping and detaining a citizen requires specific
advance planning and strict compliance thereafter. Id.
41. Id. at 1169.
42. Id. at 1171.
43. Campbell, 679 So. 2d at 1171.
44. Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S.Ct. 417, 419 (1996).
45. Id. at 419-20. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). The Court expressly
disavowed any "litmus-paper test" or single "sentence or... paragraph... rule...," in
recognition of the "endless variations in the facts and circumstances" implicating the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 506. See also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). When the
Supreme Court of Florida adopted a per se rule that questioning aboard a bus always
constitutes a seizure, the United States Supreme Court reversed, reiterating that the proper
inquiry necessitates a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 439.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/4

8

Sale and Seitles: Criminal Procedure

19971

Sale ISeitles

officer have any basis for believing that there were drugs in the car. After
ordering Robinette out of the car, issuing a warning, and returning his
driver's license, the officer took no further action related to the speeding
violation. He did, however, ask if Robinette had any weapons or illegal
contraband in his car. Thereafter, he obtained petitioner's consent to search
and found a small amount of narcotics. 46
Recognizing knowledge of the right to refuse as one factor for effective
consen, the court declined to confine valid consent to the limit of that one
The test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be
factor.
voluntary, and voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from "all
the circumstances surrounding the encounter." 48 In another decision
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court noted that while it
would be impractical to impose detailed warning requirements for consent
searches, it would be equally unrealistic to require police officers to always
they are free to go in order for a consensual search to
inform detainees that 49
be deemed voluntary. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, recognized the severe
limitations upon states to limit the action of its police officers.50 No federal
rule exists precluding a state from requiring its police officers to explain to
individuals detained at valid traffic stops when they may leave. 51 Since the
Constitution neither mandates nor prohibits the issuance of such warnings
during traffic stops, such a practice should be decided by lawmakers in each
state.5
United States v. Butler 3 further limited the defense of involuntary
consent to search, even in the face of a significant police presence.5 4 The
standard to be applied is "'whether the police conduct would have
communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline
46. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 419.

47. Id. at 421.
48. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.
49. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227

(1973).
50. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 424-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens denotes the obvious, that most
motorists have no interest in prolonging the delay occasioned by a valid traffic stop and
maintain an interest in preserving the privacy of their vehicles and possessions from others.
Id. at 425. However, the fact that Robinette's arresting officer successfully used a similar

method of obtaining consent to search roughly 786 times in one year, indicates that motorists
generally respond in a manner that is contrary to their self-interest. Id. "Repeated decisions
by ordinary citizens to surrender that interest cannot satisfactorily be explained on any
hypothesis other than an assumption that they believed they had a legal duty to do so." Id.
52. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 428.
53. 102 F.3d 1191 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1712 (1997).

54. Id. at 1197.
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the officer's request' to search. 5 5 Even though officers had stationed
themselves around the perimeter of the house in order to prevent its
occupants from leaving, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that codefendant Williams consented to the search of her home by opening
her door voluntarily. 6 Dismissing the ample assemblage of officers, it was
sufficient that Williams was informed that she could refuse the search,
signed a consent form, and was cooperative. 7
The Fifth District Court of Appeal followed the same logic when a
motorist, properly stopped for speeding, was asked additional questions
about his vehicle after his license was returned, including a request for his
registration. 58 During the conversation, another officer observed a handgun,
and a subsequent search revealed narcotics. Failing to advise a motorist that
he is "free to leave" does not show that law enforcement forced the
defendant to consent to a search of his vehicle or to talk to the officer. 9 The
ensuing observation of a weapon within the appellant's vehicle, as appellant
purported to obtain his registration, entitled the officer to arrest appellant
and conduct a further search of the vehicle.60
A warrantless search is constitutional, even if the consenting party does
not have the requisite relationship to the premises that are
searched. 61 Hence, there is no Fourth Amendment violation if an officer has
an objectively "reasonable" though mistaken, good faith belief that he has
obtained valid consent to search a particular area. 6 2 In United States v.
Brazel,63 the search of a tenant's apartment after obtaining the consent of the
landlord was upheld based upon the officer's belief the premises were
vacant. 64 The landlord, who rented his apartment to petitioner Brazel on a
month to month basis, could not remember why he thought the apartment
was vacant. Nevertheless, the officer had further evidence to believe Brazel
was living with his grandmother, warranting a search of the allegedly

55. Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)).
56. Id. at 1198.
57. Id. at 1197.
58. Watson v. State, 689 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
59. Id. at 1091.
60. Id. See Stafford v. State, 532 So. 2d 1361, 1362 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
61. See Illinois v. Rogriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990).
62. See United States v. Fernandez, 58 F.3d 593, 598 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that
where a defendant told police that a trailer belonged to his codefendant, it was reasonable for
officers to believe that the codefendant had authority to consent to a search).
63. 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 1997).
64. Id. at 1148-49.
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abandoned property.65 The court concluded that any mistake made by the
detective as to whether the premises were vacant was a mistake of fact, not
one of law.66
Based on a distinct set of facts, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
used comparable logic in UnitedStates v. Mathis.67 In his appeal, petitioner
Mathis asserted error in the district court's admission of evidence6 alleged to
be the product of searches of his residence on two occasions. 1 Mathis'
mother consented to the search of her home and the garage area, which she
said she owned. 69 Although the garage area actually belonged to Mathis, it
was "objectively reasonable" that the searching officers believed that
Mathis' mother had the authority to consent to a search of the entire
70
premises.
D. Length of an Automobile Stop
Establishing the rule that an officer's ulterior motives cannot invalidate
conduct has• not terminated the debate
legally justifiable police
•
71 over the
actual time parameters of an automobile stop. In State v. Brown, appellant
Brown's vehicle was stopped for speeding.7 The officer reported suspicious
statements made by the passengers in the vehicle; whereupon minutes later, a
backup K-9 unit arrived as Brown's tag and driver's license numbers were
still being run. Without completing the citation, the officer conducted a
license and tag check while the canine searched around the vehicle for
approximately ten minutes, eventually discovering marijuana. After the

65. Id. at 1148. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (concluding that a
tenant who abandons property loses any reasonable expectation of privacy he once had).
66. Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1149. See United States v. Elliott, 50 F.3d 180, 187'(2d Cir.
1995) (recognizing that the question of whether a given unit is unleased is one of fact, the
officers' belief that an area was vacant and that the owner could consent to a search was a
factual error). But see United States v. Brown, 961 F.2d 1039, 1041 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that a warrantless entry of tenant's apartment was unconstitutional where officer made the
mistaken legal conclusion that a landlord's authority to turn off electrical appliances or lights
also validated the officers' search of the apartment).
67. 96 F.3d 1577 (11th Cir. 1996).
[Tihe [second
68. "Two warrantless searches of the garage were conducted that day ....
search] revealed information that aided the officers' investigation [in obtaining] a search
warrant for the garage, where they subsequently found a safe hidden by Mathis containing
thousands of dollars." Id. at 1584 n.5.
69. Id. at 1584.

70. Id.
71. 691 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
72. Id. at 637.

Published by NSUWorks, 1997

11

Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 4

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 22:93

marijuana was secured in the trunk of the patrol car, the officer completed
the citation.3 In reversing the trial court's motion to suppress, the court
held that a traffic stop should not be considered completed until all
information, if it can be obtained within a reasonable time, is
returned.74 Therefore, it is permissible for officers to run a dog sniff until a
traffic stop is entirely complete.75
E.

Automobile Search WarrantException

The so-called "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment search
warrant requirement continued to broaden during this survey
period. Generally, an automobile has been one of the last few vestiges of an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights. 76 Recent decisions, however, have
put such a claim in jeopardy, making it closer to the truth to merely state that
'[a] citizen does not surrender all the protections of the Fourth Amendment
by entering an automobile."' 7 7 In Pennsylvania v. Labron,8 the United
States Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that the ready mobility of a
car and probable cause that it contains contraband, without more, permits a
warrantless search of a vehicle. 79 The case, decided by the Supreme Court,
reversed two decisions by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which ruled
that warrantless searches of automobiles are limited "where 'unforeseen
circumstances involving the search
of an automobile [are] coupled with the
80
presence of probable cause."'
In Commonwealth v. Labron,8' the police observed respondent Labron
and others engaging in a series of drug transactions on a street in
Philadelphia.82 The police arrested the suspects, searched the trunk of a car
in which the drugs had been stored, and found bags containing cocaine. 83 In
Commonwealth v. Kilgore,s4 an undercover informant agreed to buy drugs

73. Id. at 638.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 147 (1991).

77. Id. (quoting New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986)) (emphasis added).
78. 116 S. Ct. 2485 (1996).
79. Id. at 2487.
80. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 901 (Pa. 1995)) (citations
omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Kilgore, 677 A.2d 311 (Pa. 1995); Commonwealth v.
Labron, 669 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1995).
81. Labron, 669 A.2d at 918.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 677 A.2d at 311.
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from respondent Randy Lee Kilgore's accomplice, Kelly Jo Kilgore. 8 To
obtain the drugs, Kelly Jo drove from the parking lot where the deal was
made, to a farmhouse where she met with Randy Kilgore, and obtained the
narcotics. After the drugs were delivered and the Kilgores were arrested,
police searched both the farmhouse and Randy Kilgore's pickup truck,
discovering cocaine on the floor of the truck which was parked in the
driveway of the farmhouse.86 In each case, the court upheld the respondent's
motion to suppress, concluding that although probable cause existed, no
exigent circumstances justified the failure to obtain a warrant.87
The Supreme Court concluded that the state court's analysis of the
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement was
flawed, as an automobile's "ready mobility" is an exigency sufficient to
excuse failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause is
clear.88 Consequently, without acknowledging the residential location of the
car in Kilgore or the actual mobility of either vehicle, the Supreme Court
noted that probable cause and exigent circumstances existed because both
respondents were involved in illegal drug activity.89 With apparent
unbridled acceptance, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there have been
recent cases that have continued to reduce the expectation of privacy in an
automobile, further justifying their position. 90 Justice Stevens, in his
dissenting opinion, recognized the debilitation of individual citizen's rights
as motorists, and suggested the effect is not only on the individual but on the
state, noting the Supreme Court's "lack of respect" for the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and the "sophistication of its state search and seizure
law." 9' As a result, Justice Stevens suggests that the Supreme Court's edict
will make it harder for states who expressly indicate their intent to extend
the protection
92 of their constitution beyond those means available in the
Constitution.
The issue of whether probable cause and exigent circumstances existed
to justify a warrantless search of an automobile was addressed in United
States v. Brazel. 93 In Brazel, prior to the search of the car in question,

85. Id.
86. Id. at 312.
87. Id. at 313. See also Labron, 669 A.2d at 918.
88. Pennsylvaniav. Labron, 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487 (1996).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. 102 F.3d 1120, 1129 (1lth Cir. 1997). A federal grand jury indictment handed
down drug trafficking indictments against 32 people including petitioner Jefferson. Id. at

Published by NSUWorks, 1997

13

Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 4

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 22:93

detectives were aware that the true purchaser of the vehicle had a minimal
income. Petitioner Jefferson had been seen driving the same car in the
vicinity where officers were investigating a drug ring. Although cocaine was
never observed in the car by detectives, straight single-edged razor blades
were seen. The razor blades were similar to those previously found with
cocaine residue on them after a search of a garage outside the address which
surveillance photos showed Jefferson frequented.
Taking into account the totality of the circumstances at the time the
search was conducted, the court in Brazel determined that there was
probable cause to believe the car contained some evidence of drug
trafficking activities. 95 The Eleventh Circuit also found that the potential
mobility of the car satisfied the exigency requirement. 96 Petitioner Jefferson
was in custody at the time of the search, and a second set of car keys was
discovered in his girlfriend's possession at the private residence where the
car was parked. However, the court in Brazel ruled that the inherent
potential for mobility created an exigency justifying the warrantless search,
especially when other codefendants were not yet in custody, and there was
presumably a chance that a person might remove incriminating evidence
from the car. 97 As a result, Jefferson's motion to suppress evidence from the
car was denied. Consequently, Jefferson was 98convicted of conspiracy to
distribute cocaine and sentenced to life in prison.
An additional noteworthy decision clarified the rule that grants officers
the right to search the passenger compartment of an99automobile, incident to100a
In State v. Johnson,
lawful custodial arrest of the vehicle's occupants.
the record revealed that upon being approached by police officers, the
After
passengers of the vehicle exited and began to walk away.' 01
discovering marijuana on one of the men, officers searched the passenger
compartment of the petitioner's car. The Johnson case establishes that the
occupants of an automobile may not avoid the consequences of a vehicle
search by stepping outside as officers approach when a subsequent legal
arrest is made.'

1129. Jefferson, along with seven other defendants, was convicted of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine with each defendant receiving at least one life sentence. Id.
94. Id. at 1146-47.
95. Id. at 1147.
96. Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1147.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1129.
99. State v. Johnson, 696 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
100. Id. at 880.
101. Id. at 881-82.
102. Id. at 881.
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WarrantlessSearch of Property

During this survey period, in a case of first impression, the
constitutionality of the Florida Forfeiture Act was challenged. 10 3 The
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act authorizes law enforcement agencies to
seize vehicles of any kind used to "facilitate the transportation, carriage,
conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter,
exchange, or giving away of any contraband article."'0 4 "Contraband
article," includes "[a]ny controlled substance," including cocaine and its
derivatives in the statute's list of controlled substances.115 Thus, the
Forfeiture Act clearly authorizes law enforcement officials to seize any type
of vehicle used to facilitate the distribution of cocaine." 6 The Forfeiture Act
107
sets forth the procedure to be used in seizing personal property, with the
only significant pre-seizure requirement being notice of the right to a
requirement to obtain a
subsequent hearing. 10 8 Furthermore, there is0 no
9
warrant or court order before seizing a vehicle.1

103. See White v. State, 680 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996), rev. granted,687
So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1997).
104. FLA. STAT. § 932.702(3) (1995).
105. FLA. STAT. § 932.701(2)(a)(1); see also FLA. STAT. § 893.03(2)(a) (1995).
106. White, 680 So. 2d at 552.
107. The procedure to be followed is set out in the FloridaStatutes:
Personal property may be seized at the time of the violation or subsequent to
the violation, [provided that] the person entitled to notice is notified at the
time of the seizure or by certified mail, return receipt requested, that there is a
right to a [sic] adversarial preliminary hearing after the seizure to determine
whether probable cause exists to believe that such property has been or is
being used in violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.
FLA. STAT. § 932.703(2)(a).
A postseizure adversarial preliminary hearing may be requested within 15
days after receipt of this notice and the hearing must be set and noticed by the
seizing agency and held by the court within 10 days of receipt of the hearing
request or as soon as practicable thereafter. At the hearing, the court must
determine whether probable cause existed for the seizure.
White, 680 So. 2d at 552 (citation omitted).
108. Id.
109. See State v. Pomerance, 434 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that the Forfeiture Act does not specifically mention the necessity of a warrant and
finding no rationale for judicially engrafting onto the statute a requirement that a warrant be
obtained).
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In White v. State,110 based on eye-witnesses and videotape, police
officers seized White's automobile under the Forfeiture Act because it had
been used in the delivery and sale of cocaine.II The car was seized without
a warrant after a routine inventory search produced two pieces of crack
cocaine in the ashtray. The petitioner
was charged with possession of a
11 2
controlled substance and convicted.
At trial, the petitioner argued that the warrantless seizure of a motor
vehicle violates constitutional prohibitions against illegal search and
seizure. 1 3 However, "[n]either the Florida nor United States Supreme Court
has.., addressed whether the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement
officers to obtain a warrant prior to seizing a vehicle under the Florida
Forfeiture Act or similar statute."' 1 4 Nevertheless, the Florida Forfeiture Act
is substantively similar to the Federal Forfeiture Act and the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act.' 1 5
Although the federal circuits are split in their analysis of this issue, the
majority of the circuits that have considered this question have held that a
warrantless search of a vehicle under the Federal Forfeiture Act does not
violate the Fourth Amendment, and evidence obtained in subsequent
inventory searches is admissible in a criminal prosecution."
The First
District Court of Appeal joined the majority of federal circuits by holding
that a warrantless search of a motor vehicle based on probable cause that the

110. 680 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996), rev. granted,687 So. 2d 1308 (Fla.
1997).
111. Id. at551.
112. Id. at 551-52.
113. Id. at 553.
114. Id. Because of the significance of this issue and the fact that it is a case of first
impression, the court certified the following question:
WHETHER THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE
UNDER THE FLORIDA FORFEITURE ACT (ABSENT OTHER EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES) VIOLATES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION SO AS TO RENDER EVIDENCE
SEIZED IN A SUBSEQUENT INVENTORY SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE
INADMISSIBLE IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.
White, 680 So. 2d at 555.
115. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1997).
116. See United States v. Decker, 19 F.3d 287, 287 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1241 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Valdes, 876 F.2d 1554, 1560
(11th. Cir. 1989); United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, Four-Door Sedan, 711 F.2d
1297, 1302 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 402 (4th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 368 (3d Cir. 1981). But see United States v. Dixon, I F.3d
1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1305 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1989).
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vehicle was used in violation of the Forfeiture Act does not violate the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' 7 The court, affirming the conviction of White, reasoned that if
police officers with probable cause can arrest drug traffickers without a
warrant, they should be equally able to seize "the vehicle the trafficker has
been using to transport his drugs."' 8 Since the expectation of privacy with
respect to one's automobile has gradually declined under the "automobile
exception," a motor vehicle may be seized for the same reasons under the
circumstances other
Forfeiture Act without a prior warrant absent exigent
9
than the characteristics inherent in a motor vehicle.1
It should be noted, however, that Judge Wolf admonished the majority
for upholding the
120search and permitting property to be seized merely upon
By applying this concept, the warrant requirements for
probable cause.
the seizure of a vehicle will be crippled. 2i Moreover, it mistakenly suggests
that the forfeiture statute authorizes the seizures of property absent exigent
the exigent circumstances exception to the
circumstances, trivializing
122
warrant requirement.

G.

Use of Informants to EstablishProbableCause

The continued problems with the use of informants to establish
probable cause during the past survey year beleaguered the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, which intertwined varied legal standards to find common
12 3
ground for such elicited information. For example, in Ortega v. Christian,
the court concluded that an informant's tip lacked the essential elements to
constitute probable cause to believe appellant124Ortega participated in a
robbery, thereby validating his false arrest claim.
In Ortega, a confidential informant told the Metro-Dade Police
Department that an organized group, of which he was a member, committed
the robbery. The informant provided the address of the alleged robber's
residence and proceeded with officers to that address. The informant
identified Ortega who vehemently proclaimed his innocence and requested
an opportunity to prove a case of mistaken identity. Officers refused to
117.
118.
1989)).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

White, 680 So. 2d at 553.
Id. at 554 (quoting United States v. Valdes, 876 F.2d 1554, 1559-60 (1lth. Cir.
Id. at 554-55 (citing Califomia v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985)).
Id. at 559 (Wolf, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
White, 680 So. 2d at 559.
85 F.3d 1521 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1525.
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comply with Ortega's request and failed to make any inquiries into the
claims of innocence, denying the opportunity for Ortega to appear in a lineup or photo spread. Despite the fact that Ortega was never identified by the
victim as the perpetrator
of the robbery, petitioner was incarcerated for five
125
months without bond.
In determining whether an informant's tip rises to the level of probable
cause, the totality of the circumstances must be assessed. 126 Relevant factors
include the "informant's 'veracity,'
'reliability,' and 'basis of
knowledge."", 127 "In addition, the corroboration of the details of an
informant's tip through independent police work adds significant value to
the probable cause analysis. ' 128 In reversing the dismissal of Ortega's false
arrest claim against the officer, the Eleventh Circuit strictly examined
additional factors that demonstrated that the informant's information had not
given the arresting officer probable cause to believe Ortega had participated
in a robbery. 129 There must be evidence in the complaint that demonstrates a
past history between the informant and the arresting officer. 30 Furthermore,
"an informant's tip that is bolstered [through] the fact that it is based on his
own personal observation rather than hearsay." 131 Finally, making
statements "against one's penal interests without more will not raise an
informant's tip
to the level of probable cause required under the Fourth
' r
Amendment.
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Talley133 relied
exclusively on whether the information provided by the confidential
informant, when combined with the government's independent
corroboration, gave rise to probable cause.
Without reference to the
relationship between the informant and the officers or the informant's
personal knowledge of the petitioner, the court affirmed Talley's conviction
of aiding and abetting another in possession with the intent to distribute
crack cocaine.
The accurate information provided by the informant

125. Id. at 1524.
126. Id. at 1525.
127. Id. See United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1003 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)).
128. Ortega, 85 F.3d at 1525 (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1003
( lIth Cir. 1992)).
129. Id. at 1525.
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing United States v. Reyes, 792 F.2d 536, 539 (5th Cir. 1986)).
132. Id.
133. 108 F.3d 277 (11th Cir. 1997).
134. Id. at 281.
135. Id. at 282.
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included the location and description of petitioner's vehicle and a report that
Talley possessed cocaine.136 This was corroborated by officers who noticed
sufficient probable cause to
a visible bulge in Talley's pants, thus providing
137
search the codefendant's car for contraband.
The scope of an informant's information used to establish probable
cause to justify a search warrant was enlarged further in United States v.
Butler.138 The standard set forth in Butler asks whether there is a "'fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found."",139 One
informant stated that appellant Campbell kept cocaine in his garage at his
residence for the past two years, yet the affidavit did not state the basis for
this information. However, other informants told of purchases they had
made from Campbell at his home. Finally, based upon the appellant's
employment status, he was found to have a substantial amount of
unexplained wealth. 14° Based on these facts, and applying the "fair
probability" standard, the issuance of the warrant was deemed appropriate
supported allegations that appellant was involved in the
since the affidavit
14 1
drug trade.
H. Warrantless Use of ThermalImage Detectors
The utilization of advanced technology by law enforcement officials to
help combat crime continues to raise interesting questions regarding whether
the use of a particular technology in a given situation violates a person's
expectation of privacy. 142 One technological advance that has raised
frequent debate is the use of thermal or infrared image devices to gather
information of possible criminal activity. 143 Without directly answering the
constitutionality of its use, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v.
Siegel,144 affirmatively recognized the information 145from thermal infrared
detectors to support the issuance of a search warrant.

136. Id. at 281.
137. Id.

102F.3d 1191 (1lth Cir 1997).
Id. at 1198 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
lad
Id.
See Thomas M. MeIsheimer & Thomas M. Walsh, Criminal Procedure:
Confession, Search and Seizure, 49 SMU L. REV. 853 (1996).
143. Id. at 866.
144. 679 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
145. Id. at 1204. No Florida court has expressly ruled on the constitutionality of using
such thermal or infrared imaging devices, although the issue has been raised in many other
jurisdictions. Id. at 1204 n.3. Generally, the discussion is based upon an individual's
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
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In Siegel, investigators received an anonymous tip that Siegel desired to
establish an indoor marijuana-growing operation with the use of a
trailer. They discovered that Siegel had rented a trailer and was generating
inordinately high electric bills for particular months. With the use of
infrared detectors, officers from the Aviation Division of the Sheriff's Office
conducted a flight over the rented trailer. The equipment allows its operator
to see a depiction of heat escaping into the environment from an area or
structure. The results from the flight revealed a large amount of heat
escaping from Siegel's trailer. Since weather conditions did not warrant
such heat usage, the large amount of heat may have come from high intensity
lights, commonly used in indoor marijuana-growing operations. 46 Another
thermal imager, used at ground level to detect differences in temperature,
revealed excessively
high levels of heat being emitted into the environment
147
from the trailer.
After a warrant was executed and the marijuana-growing operation was
discovered, the trial court granted Siegel's motion to suppress the seized
evidence concluding that law enforcement officers were on a "'fishing
expedition"' specifically prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 4 8 In
reversing the ruling of the lower court and following the lead of the majority
of federal district courts of appeals, Siegel clearly recognized the use of
thermal image devices. 49 The court held that although no single shred of
evidence may be conclusive, the various pieces of information
created a fair
150
probability that marijuana would be found in the trailer.

expectation of privacy, requiring a warrant if an individual has evidenced a subjective actual
expectation of privacy and if that expectation is one that society is prepared to acknowledge as
reasonable. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). The weight of authority
is that the use of thermal or infrared image devices does not require a warrant. Butler, 102
F.3d at 1204 n.3. See United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328-31 (1lth Cir. 1995);
United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 857 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Zimmer, 14 F.3d
286, 288 (6th Cir. 1994). Only a minority of courts have held that such activities may amount
to searches under the Fourth Amendment. Butler, 102 F.3d at 1204 n.3. See United States v.
Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1518-19 (W.D. Wis. 1994); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 604
(Wash. 1994).
146. Siegel, 679 So. 2d at 1202-03.
147. Id. at 1203.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1204.
150. Id. at 1205.
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I11. MINIMALLY INTRUSIVE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

A.

Reasonable Suspicion-Groundsfor a Terry Stop

The controlling factors surrounding what constitutes reasonable
suspicion to warrant a Terry stop 151 continue to be debated in the State of
Florida and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, culminating in several
noteworthy decisions during the past year. Generally, however, the issue
continues to remain the one area of criminal procedure that the courts in this
survey give great scrutiny and analysis, particularly since it is the first stage
of infringement upon an individual's liberty.
By virtue of the fact that reasonable suspicion is a less demanding
standard than probable cause, the license to use anonymous tips to establish
reasonable suspicion has been abused yet unrebuked by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. In Riley v. Montgomery,152 the Eleventh Circuit held that
reasonable suspicion existed justifying an automobile stop and subsequent
pat-down searches of the vehicle's passengers. 153 In Riley, an anonymous
tipster had indicated that Riley was transporting cocaine. In fact, Riley was
seen entering a vehicle matching the informant's description. Another tip,
corroborating this information, gave the license plate number of the vehicle
Riley was driving. The court found the anonymous tip, corroborated by the
of
other informant and independent police work, to show a "greater indicia 154
a stop.
reliability" for the officers to have "reasonable suspicion" to make
Despite the dismissal of Riley's earlier indictment for possession of cocaine
and an investigation into the Montgomery Police Department Narcotics and
Intelligence Unit, the court expressed absolute faith in the reliability of these
anonymous tips. 155 The court unabashedly accepted the fact that the
investigation uncovered evidence of extensive abuse involving the existence
of a fund used to pay confidential informants for tips, including falsifying

151. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). As a result of Terry, police may conduct a wide
array of searches and seizures on a basis of reasonable suspicion, a significantly lesser
standard than probable cause, for the purpose of concluding whether a crime has been or is
about to be committed and if the suspect is the person who committed or is planning the
offense. See JOSHUADRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 185 (1991).
152. 104 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 1997). The plaintiff Riley brought civil rights and
malicious prosecution actions against the City of Montgomery and the relevant police officers
involved in his arrest. The Eleventh Circuit, dismissing the actions, found that Riley failed to
provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate misconduct on behalf of the arresting police
officers. Id. at 1251-52.
153. Id. at 1251.
154. Id. at 1252.
155. Id.
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the identity of informants and smuggling money by recording transfers of
payments to informants who did not exist.
The skepticism of anonymous tips to establish reasonable suspicion has
resulted in more careful and thorough examinations by Florida courts during
this survey period. In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Riley,
who briefly examined the role of an informant, the Third District Court of
Appeal meticulously analyzed both the content of the information possessed
by police and its degree of reliability when deciding
whether •the
•
• facts
157 from
an anonymous 911 emergency call constituted reasonable suspicion.
In State v. Gonzalez, 158 a citizen made a 911 emergency call to report
that two men were removing what appeared to be appliances from a
neighborhood house into a white van at approximately 3:00 a.m. 159 The
caller gave the dispatcher the address in an area which had continual
problems with theft of air conditioners and other appliances. Furthermore,
earlier investigations had also focused on locating a suspicious white
van. Officers who received the message encountered the van and discovered
numerous air condition units after appellants consented to a vehicle
search. The Third District Court of Appeal thoroughly assessed the
anonymous tips and how they related to the relevant facts, yet nevertheless
recognized that although it was "theoretically possible that this was the
owner's 3:00 a.m. moving party, common experience teaches that the
probabilities were otherwise and a stop for investigation was reasonable in
the circumstances."' 160 In its detailed decision the court acknowledged that
the process to determine reasonable suspicion is one of "probability" not
"hard certainties."' 161 The court in Gonzalez concluded that "[w]hen the
'whole picture' is considered, there was more than enough reasonable
suspicion to support the investigatory stop.' 62
Therefore, in the State of Florida, courts have generally maintained
strict standards in what constitutes reasonable, articulable suspicion, an area
where an individual's civil liberties have not rapidly eroded:
[A]n officer may temporarily detain an individual for investigative
questioning if the officer has a reasonable suspicion based on
articulable facts that the individual is committing, has committed,
or is about to commit a crime. In determining whether an officer
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Riley, 104 F.3d at 1250.
State v. Gonzalez, 682 So. 2d 1168, 1170-71 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 1168.
Id.at 1169.
Id.at 1171.
Id.at 1170 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
Gonzalez, 682 So. 2d at 1172.
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possesses a founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify an
investigatory 6stop,
the totality of the circumstances must be taken
3
into account.

In considering the totality of the circumstances, the court may look
at: "'[T]he time of day, the day of the week, the location, the physical
appearance and behavior of the suspect, the appearance and manner of
operation of any vehicle involved or anything incongruous or4 unusual in the
situation as interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge.""51
The scrutiny by which the courts of Florida analyze reasonable
suspicion is exemplified in Welch v. State. 65 In Welch, the Second District
Court of Appeal narrowly tailored the meaning of the phrase "anything
incongruous or unusual," as perceived by law enforcement.166 Welch was
sitting on a bicycle with a very small plastic baggie in his hand, when two
officers in a patrol car approached him from behind. As soon as Welch saw
the officers, he shoved the baggie down his pants motivating one officer to
grab the appellant by his trousers and causing rock cocaine to fall to the
ground. 167 The court held that neither the mere sight of Welch sitting on a
bicycle with a baggie in a high crime location, nor the subsequent
concealment thereof, established a legitimate suspicion to seize or detain
Welch.168 Although the officers could have properly engaged in a policecitizen
encounter with Welch, they acted prematurely in actually seizing
169
him.
Other cases where officers lack reasonable suspicion involve activities
that may be equally attributable to legal activity as to illegal activity. 70 In
Bowen v. State,171 an officer patrolling a parking lot of a motel where prior
criminal activity had taken place approached a vehicle with persons who
' 72
were allegedly acting nervous and attempting "'to tuck something away."
The officer ordered the occupants out of the car whereupon petitioner
Bowen dropped a straw with white powder, later identified as cocaine. The

163. Jenkins v. State, 685 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citations
omitted) (footnote omitted).
164. Id. (quoting State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App.
1978)).
165. 689 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
166. Id. at 1241.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Bowen v. State, 685 So. 2d 942, 943 (Fla.5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
171. Id. at 942.
172. Id. at 943.
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fact that the officer could not see clearly into the car or that the occupants
could have been engaTing in criminal activity is insufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion.
Once again, a Florida court emphasizes that an
officer's fear does not justify ordering an occupant out of a vehicle that is
not legally stopped. 174 This would open the door for police officers to75 order
persons "'out of their automobiles under almost any circumstances.""1
Several Florida district courts of appeal have decidedly contrasting
analyses in applying furtive movements to constitute reasonable
suspicion. For example, in Jenkins v. State,176 the officer's knowledge of
burglaries in the area, coupled with Jenkins' furtive movements with objects
consistent with the type of products recently stolen from a Radio Shack,
justified an investigatory stop. 77 In stark contrast, in JB.v. State,178 the
court held that the appellant's quick movement to conceal something as an
officer approached "did not create a founded suspicion of criminal activity
justifying an investigative stop.' 79 In a high crime area, an officer who
observes someone make a furtive movement may have his "suspicions
aroused," but is prohibited from legally detaining the person for further
investigation. 8 0
The distinction between "stop then drop" and "drop then stop" was at
issue in State v. Woods.
Woods, who was sitting on a chair, got up and
walked away when officers approached. An officer followed him and yelled
for him to stop at which time Woods turned and dropped two bags of cocaine
and a handgun onto the ground. 82 The Fourth District Court of Appeal held
that the trial court erred in its finding that the stop preceded the drop and
reversed the lower court's order granting the appellant's motion to
suppress. 83 An unlawful seizure does not take place when a person fails to
184
stop when requested to do so.
An unlawful seizure occurs "only if the
person either willingly obeys or is physically forced to obey the police

173. Id. at 944.
174. Id.
175. Bowen, 685 So. 2d at 944 (quoting Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 187 n.1 (Fla.
1993)).
176. 685 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
177. Id. at 921.
178. 679 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
179. Id. at 1297.
180. Id.
181. 680 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
182. Id. at 631.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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request."' 85 Therefore, it is not considered an unlawful seizure when 8the
6
person "'drops then stops,"' even if the drop occurs after an order to stop.
Evidence that justifies "a] valid stop does not necessarily mean that
there can be a valid frisk."18 The First District Court of Appeal found it
unnecessary to decide whether there was a basis for reasonable suspicion
that a person was engaged in criminal activity because probable cause is the
As both FloridaStatutes1 9 and case law indicate,
essential requirement
an officer must have probable cause to believe a suspect is armed before the
search or frisk of a suspect to ascertain the
officer can conduct a pat-down
r
presence of a weapon. 90
In Stalling v. State,'9' the appellant was a passenger in an automobile
The vehicle was rented and neither the
stopped for a traffic infraction.
driver nor appellant were authorized as drivers on the rental agreement. The
officer told Stalling that he and the driver would be driven to a telephone
where they could arrange for transportation. Prior to permitting Stalling to
enter the police car,
193 the officer patted him down discovering three packages
of crack cocaine.
It is undisputed that the officer did not have a warrant to conduct
the pat-down search of the appellant. When no warrant has been
secured, the rule is that the search or seizure is per se unreasonable

185. Id.
186. Woods, 680 So. 2d at 631.
187. Stalling v. State, 678 So. 2d 843, 845 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Shaw
v. State, 611 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
188. Id at 845.
189. Section 901.151(5) of the FloridaStatutes states:
Whenever any law enforcement officer authorized to detain temporarily any
person under the provisions of subsection (2) has probable cause to believe
that any person whom he has temporarily detained, or is about to detain
temporarily, is armed with a dangerous weapon and therefore offers a threat
to the safety of the officer or any other person, he may search such person so
temporarily detained only to the extent necessary to disclose, and for the
purpose of disclosing, the presence of such weapon. If such a search
discloses such a weapon or any evidence of a criminal offense it may be
seized.
FLA. STAT. § 901.151(5) (1996).
190. See Shaw v. State, 611 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
191. 678 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
192. Id. at 844.

193. Id.
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unless it falls within 94
one of the well established exceptions to the
warrant requirement.1
Although Terry created the right of a law enforcement officer to conduct a
pat-down search "to find weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are
then in possession of the person whom he has stopped,"'195 there is still no
blanket exception for an officer's "routine" pat-down of a detainee prior to
placing him in a police cruiser. 196 As a result, the First District Court of
Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion
to suppress and Stalling's conviction was reversed for a lack of probable
cause.
In Turner v. State,198 the Fifth District Court of Appeal reaffirmed that
an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch alone will not warrant
an investigatory search. 99 In Turner, officers were dispatched to investigate
a report that people were arguing over drugs. When they arrived, there was
no argument and no drugs were visible. Nevertheless, Turner and his friends
were approached by police officers and immediately patted down. At the
officer's request, Turner consented to be searched again and three wrapped
pieces of crack cocaine items were removed from his pocket.
The court held that in order to seize Turner's person and to pat him
down for weapons, the officers needed a well-founded suspicion that Turner
was involved in criminal activity. 200 The law enforcement officer must be
able to articulate the reasons for his suspicion. 201 Prior criminal activity at
the same location and an officer's hunch are insufficient evidence to warrant
an investigatory search.20 2 The court determined that when the officers
person. 203 After illegal police
initially patted down Turner, they seized hishis
conduct, a consent to search is presumptively tainted and is deemed
involuntary absent clear and convincing evidence sufficient to minimize the
taint of prior illegal action by law enforcement officials. 0 4 Consequently,

194. Id. (citing Jones v. State, 648 So. 2d 669, 674 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 575 U.S.
1147 (1995)).
195. Stalling, 678 So. 2d at 845 (quoting Shaw v. State, 611 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1992)) (emphasis omitted).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 846.
198. 674 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
199. Id. at 897.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. See also Smith v. State, 637 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
203. Turner, 674 So. 2d at 897.
204. Id. at 898.
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the court ruled that Turner's consent to search was tainted, reversing the trial
court's denial of the appellant's motion to suppress. 20 5
B.

ConsensualEncountersv. InvestigatoryDetentions

Perhaps the most divisive issue that has surrounded the Florida district
courts of appeal during the past survey year involves the point when a
consensual encounter becomes an investigatory stop. The underlying theme
in these cases involves requests by officers, to those being questioned, to
remove their hands from their pockets.
In State v. Baldwin,2°6 the Fifth District Court of Appeal applied an
objective test?0 7 to determine whether a reasonable person would have
leave during an interaction with law enforcement
thought they
20 8 were free to
officials.
[The] factors that might indicate a seizure, even where the
individual did not attempt to leave, include 'the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer,
some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of
language of tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer's request might be compelled.'
The subjective intentions of the detainee are immaterial when examining
whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred.210

205. Id.

206. 686 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The undisputed facts are that
Baldwin was sitting on a front cement stoop with another gentlemen when they were
approached by police officers. Id. at 683. Baldwin was asked to remove his hands from his
pockets and complied, but he returned them back to his pockets after numerous requests not to
do so. The last time Baldwin pulled his hands out of his pockets, he threw a paper bag on the
ground which contained cocaine. Id. The court remanded the case back to the trial court to
apply an objective test, i.e., whether a reasonable person would have thought they were free to
leave when the officer asked Baldwin to remove his hands from his pockets. Id. at 687.
207. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); State v. M.J., 685 So.
2d 1350, 1352 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that defendant's spontaneous and
voluntary offer to allow the officer to check him extended from the initial consensual
encounter and pat-down to the officer's later act of reaching into defendant's pocket and
withdrawing a crack pipe).
208. Baldwin, 686 So. 2d at 686.
209. Id. at 685 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
210. Id. at 686.
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In State v. Woodard,211 two police officers entered an apartment
building looking for a person with multiple outstanding warrants. 2 12 The
officers knocked on the door and questioned Woodard and the other
occupants about their presence in the building, asked for the names of the
men, and checked them for outstanding warrants. At no time was Woodard
ordered to remain or otherwise told that he was not free to leave. Prior to the
radio response on the warrant checks, Woodard reached into his
pockets. When the officer asked him to remove his hands from his pants,
Woodard discarded a clear plastic bag from his pocket proving to be
cocaine. 213 The court held that the investigating officer's request to have
Woodard remove his hands from his pockets, "when made to ensure an
officer's safety, does not elevate a consensual encounter to a detention. 214
The Second District Court of Appeal distinguished Woodard from their
previous decision in Mayhue v. State,1 5 where the court had ruled that an
investigatory detention resulted when an officer ordered the detainee to open
his clenched fist. 21 6 The court reasoned that, unlike the palm of a hand, "a
pocket has the capacity to conceal a lethal weapon. 217 However, such a
distinction may be misguided2 1since
a razor blade, knife, or small firearm may
8
be concealed in a closed fist.
Acknowledging there is no litmus test for distinguishing a consensual
encounter from a seizure, the Fifth District Court of Appeal did differentiate
between "an order" and "a request" from a police officer.219 In State v.
Johnson,22 officers approached the appellants, Johnson and Ryan, who had
just exited their vehicle.221 During the encounter, the law enforcement
official requested that Ryan remove his hands from his pocket because the
officer felt uncomfortable. Ryan proceeded to empty his pockets revealing a
small amount of cannabis. Based on the facts, the court noted that it is
difficult to imagine how such an inquiry could intimidate Ryan into
emptying his pockets from the unintrusive officer's statement: "Would you
mind removing your hands from your pockets while we talk?, 222 A request

211. 681 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
212. Id. at 734-35.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 735 (citations omitted).
215. 659 So. 2d 417 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
216. Woodard, 681 So. 2d at735 n.1.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 736 (Parker, J., concurring).
219. State v. Johnson, 696 So. 2d 880, 882 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
220. Id. at 880.
221. Id. at 881.
222. Id.at 882.
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to exit a vehicle might cause a reasonable person to conclude that he is not
free to leave; however, the same
223 may not be said of a request to remove
one's hands from their pockets.
The dissent argued that the distinction between "request" and "order" is
not determinative. 224 Whether the officer's directive is characterized as a
request or an order, if a person submits by removing his or her hands from
their pocket, the consensual encounter becomes a seizure.225 To Judge
Thompson, the question is not one of choice: Either follow the directive of
the officer or disobey the officer and suffer dire consequences. 226 Although
mindful of the officer's need to be careful of citizens who may be armed, "an
officer's concern for his safety is not a basis to violate a citizen's Fourth
Amendment rights. 227
In light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Maryland
v. Wilson, 228 the concern for officer safety has widened the parameters of
consensual encounters. 229 In King v. State,230 decided a few months after the
notable decision by the highest court, the Second District Court of Appeal
reiterated that the reasonableness of an officer's request during a consensual
encounter "'depends on a balance between the public interest and the
individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers."'' 2 1 In King, an officer approached King who was standing in the

223. Id.
224. Johnson, 696 So. 2d at 883 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
225. The dissent cites a number of decisions that suggest how divided the courts in
Florida are over this issue. Id. at 883. See Gipson v. State, 667 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (ruling that a person stopped by police on the street who is ordered to
remove his hands from his pocket evolves from a consensual encounter into a seizure); Doney
v. State, 648 So. 2d 799, 801 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that compliance with
officer's request that appellant spit out contents of his mouth was acquiescence to authority
rather than consent); Palmer v. State, 625 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that abandonment of a razor blade was a product of an illegal stop and thus
involuntary because seizure occurred when officer told defendant to take his hands out of his
pockets); Harrison v. State, 627 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding
that once an officer orders a person to remove his or her hand from a pocket, the consensual
encounter becomes a seizure). But see Sander v. State, 595 So. 2d 1099, 1100 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (determining it was not improper for officer to ask defendant to remove hands
from his pockets).
226. Johnson, 696 So. 2d at 884.
227. Id.
228. 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
229. Id. at 885. The Court held that an officer making a traffic stop may order
passengers to get out of the vehicle pending the completion of the stop. Id.
230. 696 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
231. Id. at 862 (quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885 (1997)).
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middle of the road apparently dazed. The officer attempted to speak with
King to see if he needed assistance. King did not respond and placed his
hands in his pockets. The officer told the appellant to remove his hands, and
King complied by placing his hands behind his back. The officer, concerned
for his own safety, grabbed King and placed him against the 232
patrol car. As
he did, he observed a crack pipe protruding from King's pants.
Accordingly, the court held that when an officer makes a reasonable
request to an individual to remove his hands from his pockets and the person
refuses to comply, "the individual's right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference is outweighed by the public interest in officer
Law enforcement officials should not have to expose themselves
safety."
to potential dangers each time they have to investigate a situation.234 The
Second District Court of Appeal appears to have overstepped the boundaries
of what constitutes a consensual encounter by adding that permissible
actions by police officers include "physically" taking whatever reasonable
actions are necessary to "thwart any threatening actions by the person
encountered so as to dispel any reasonable fear of harm." 235 The
repercussions of Maryland v. Wilson236 have already demonstrated their
impact on Florida courts, not only broadening the standard of what
constitutes a consensual encounter, but redefining its boundaries to include
officers' requests made in the interest of safety.
C. Length of an InvestigatoryDetention
The issue regarding at what point a prolonged detention becomes an
arrest was decided by the Third District Court of Appeal.237 The Third
District Court of Appeal ruled in Saturnino-Boudet v. State,23' that the
detention of appellant Boudet for thirty to forty minutes awaiting the arrival
of a canine unit was "nothing more than a Terry stop 239 utilized to dispel the
police officer's reasonable suspicion that Boudet was involved in the sale of
illegal narcotics., 240 Boudet arrived at the home of William Daniels, where
police detectives were conducting a narcotics investigation. The detectives
approached Boudet who voluntarily exited his car, leaving the driver's side
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 861.
Id. at 862.
King, 696 So. 2d at 862.
Id.
117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
Satumino-Boudet v. State, 682 So. 2d 188, 190 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 188.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Saturnino-Boudet,682 So. 2d at 192.
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door open. Boudet produced identification upon request but refused to
consent to have his vehicle searched, whereupon detectives visually
observed alleged drug paraphernalia located on the front passenger's side in
his car. Boudet was detained in the Daniels' residence until the arrival of the
narcotics sniff dog who alerted the presence of cocaine. The appellant
unsuccessfully moved to suppress the cocaine in the court below and
appealed on the grounds that he was effectively arrested without probable
cause when police ordered him into the house.2 4'
Courts continue to acknowledge the difficulty in distinguishing
"between an investigative detention and a de facto arrest."242 The standard
set forth in determining reasonableness to make such a detention is whether
law enforcement authorities "'diligently pursued a means of investigation
that was likely to 'conform or dispel their suspicions quickly.' 243 The
detention should "'last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose
of the stop."' 244 However, since Boudet was never physically removed from
the scene nor detained for an unreasonable time, 2 6 the court disagreed
with the petitioner's argument that he was de facto arrested without probable
cause.247 Under the circumstances, Boudet was not detained longer than
necessary for officers to dispel their reasonable suspicion that the petitioner
was involved in illegal narcotics activity.248

241. Id. at 190.
242. Id. at 192.
243. Id. (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985)).
244. Id. (quoting Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 684).
245. Saturnino-Boudet,682 So. 2d at 193. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815
(1985) (deciding petitioner's involuntary transportation to police station without probable
cause or judicial authorization for fingerprinting violated petitioner's Fourth Amendment
rights); State v. Rivas-Marmol, 679 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding
defendant de facto arrested for D.U.I. where handcuffed, placed in patrol car, and transported
to police station for purposes of administering a breathalyzer test).
246. See Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 1990) (approving detention for
45 minutes while awaiting canine unit is reasonable); State v. Nugent, 504 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla.

4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding 30 minute delay did not transform Terry stop into an arrest);
Finney v. State, 420 So. 2d 639, 643 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (finding officers justified in

detaining defendant for approximately 90 minutes).
247. Saturnino-Boudet,682 So. 2d at 193.

248. Id.
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IV. SEARCH WARRANTS

A.

Sufficiency of Description

During this survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida and at least
one district court of appeal made it clear that warrants without sufficient
description and specificity will result in suppression of evidence. 249 In
Green v. State,250 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the recurring
problem of how specific a search warrant must be in describing the items to
be seized under the authority of that warrant.25 1 The court adopted the rule
that "when the purpose of the search is to find specific property, the warrant
this• property
should particularly
••,,describe
•
252 in order to preclude the possibility
of the police seizing any other" items.
Petitioner Green, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death,
challenged the admission of the clothes he was wearing on the night of the
murder, which were seized pursuant to a search warrant. 3 Eyewitnesses
identified Green as the shooter and described to police that Green was
wearing a black pinstriped suit, a white shirt, and a brown trench
coat. However, the search warrant authorized the police to search for the
clothes that Green was wearing on the evening the weapon was used, and
other evidence relating to the murder.254 Although the police officers who
executed the warrant had information not contained in the warrant, the court
found it irrelevant in its analysis, and it was not scrutinized.255 The search
must be based on the language of the warrant alone. 6 As a result, it was not
possible for an officer to decide with reasonable clarity which articles of
clothing the officer was empowered to seize. 7 The court concluded that
search warrant's broad description of the items to be seized,
because of the,,,,258
In considering the use of
the "fruit of [the] search must be suppressed.
259
Green held that the facial invalidity of the
the good faith exception,

249. See Green v. State, 688 So. 2d 301, 306 (1996); Buggs v. State, 693 So. 2d 57, 5859 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App 1997).
250. Green, 688 So. 2d at 301.
251. Id. at 306.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 305.
254. Id. at 306.
255. Green, 688 So. 2d at 306.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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warrant impedes the application of this exception since no officer could
reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.260
When there are omissions in an affidavit that may actually defeat a
warrant, the test is to "consider the affidavit as though it included the
omitted information in determining whether the warrant is based on probable
cause. ' 261 In Buggs v. State,26 2 the affidavit submitted on behalf of the search
warrant described in detail the physical characteristics of Buggs, including
his pattern of speech.263 Yet the petitioner argued that the affidavit lacked
sufficient evidence that should have defeated the warrant. 264 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal applied the aforementioned test concluding that
even if the affidavit had mentioned that no fingerprints were found and that
other suspects were in the same area the night of the murder,
265 the affidavit
still would have stated probable cause to justify the warrant.
B.

Detention of Property

Authorizing the seizure of property through civil forfeiture was grounds
to address the threshold procedural
266 requirements mandated under the Fifth
Applying the policy to the seizure of
Amendment Due Process Clause.
real property, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
government must provide notice and a hearing prior to executing an arrest
267
268
warrant issued against real property.
In UnitedStates v. 408 Peyton Road, the government secured ex parte
warrants authorizing the seizure of appellant Richardson's properties. 269 The
warrant maintained that Richardson had financed the acquisition and
development of the properties through drug trafficking activities, citing the
fact that the appellant's reported income was insufficient to sustain real
estate activities of this kind. Furthermore, Richardson had allegedly engaged
in a series of suspect financial transactions. The government executed the
warrant to arrest and take into custody Richardson's properties, whereupon
copies of the federal arrest warrants were posted at each of the appellant's
properties. The facts establish that the government neither posted warning
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Green, 688 So. 2d at 306.
Buggs v. State, 693 So. 2d 57, 59 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 59.
United States v. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d 1106, 1108 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1109.
Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1108.
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signs on the properties nor changed the locks. Richardson challenged the
government's failure to provide a pre-seizure notice and hearing, depriving
him of property without due process of law.2
In 408 Peyton Road, the court analyzed "whether the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause prohibits the Government in a civil forfeiture case from
seizing real property without first affording the owner notice and an
opportunity to be heard.",271 To consider whether a hearing was required, the
Eleventh Circuit applied a three part inquiry requiring the consideration
of: 1) the private interest affected by the official action; 2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, as well as
the probable value of additional safeguards; and 3) the Government's
interest, including the administrative burden that additional requirements
would impose.272
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had applied this balancing test
in a factually similar setting, holding "that the lack of notice and a hearing
prior to issuance of the warrants seizing [a person's] properties rendered the
warrants 'invalid and unconstitutional. ,
However, unlike the seizure in
that case, 274 the government in 408 Peyton Road elected not to evict the
residents, post warning signs, or change the locks on the property,
concluding that it never "seized '2 75 the property because it refrained form

270. Id.
271. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at 1108. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993). "As a general matter, the government must provide notice and
a hearing prior to depriving an individual of property." Id. at 48. The United States
Constitution "tolerates exceptions to that general rule only in 'extraordinary situations where
some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the
event."' Id. at 53.
272. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at 1109. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321
(1976).
273. United States v. 2751 Peyton Woods Trail, 66 F.3d 1164, 1167 (11th Cir. 1995)
(quoting United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, Located at 9638 Chicago Heights, St.
Louis, Mo, 27 F.3d 327, 300 (8th Cir. 1994)).
274. Id. at 1164.
275. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at 1109-10. The Supreme Court in Good has never
explicitly defined the term "seizure," however, the government suggested that physical control
is an essential element of seizure because the facts in Good involved some level of physical
intrusion. See Good, 510 U.S. at 49. Contrary to this assertion, the Supreme Court never
indicated that the exercise of physical control should be regarded as a constitutionally
cognizable seizure. In fact, the term seizure was applied more broadly to refer to
governmental action that deprived claimant Good of significant property interests. See United
States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (holding that a seizure of property occurs when
there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/4

34

Sale and Seitles: Criminal Procedure

1997]

Sale / Seitles

asserting physical control over it.276 While 408 Peyton Road did not involve
a physically intrusive seizure, the court nevertheless assessed whether the
pre-deprivation notice and a
magnitude of the private interests required
277
inquiry.
Mathews
the
applying
by
hearing
Applying the first Mathews factor the mere execution of the arrest
warrant implicated "private interests" 178 protected by the Due Process
Clause because it bestowed upon the government important rights of
ownership.27 9 The fact that the seizures were not physically intrusive was
not dispositive, the court holding that "cognizable seizure of real property
need not involve physical intrusion." 280 An analysis of the second factor led
the Eleventh Circuit to conclude that "the practice of an ex parte seizure
creates an unacceptable risk of error, offer[ing] little or no protection for
innocent owners. ' 2 81 A breakdown of the final component of the analysis
suggested that no pressing need for prompt governmental action justified ex
parte seizure of real property in the civil forfeiture context. The court
reasoned that "the Government could secure its legitimate interest without
seizing the subject property. 28 2 Therefore, the government deprived
Richardson of due process when it seized 408 Peyton Road, notwithstanding
the decision not to assert physical control over it.
C.

Knock andAnnounce Principle

In the case of Richards v. Wisconsin,284 the Supreme Court revisited
their previous decision which ruled that the Fourth Amendment incorporates
property). Therefore, property deprivations, of the magnitude declared in Good, must be
preceded by notice and a hearing. See 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at 1110.
276. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at I110.

277. Id. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
278. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at 1109 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
279. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at I110.
280. Id. at 1111.
281. Id. See United States v.James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 55
(1993). As Justice Frankfurter observed, "[n]o better instrument has been devised for arriving
at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and
opportunity to meet it." Id. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
concurring).
171 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
282. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at 1112. The government may prevent the sale of the
property by "filing a notice of lis pendens" as authorized by state law when advised of the
forfeiture proceedings. Id. "If an owner seems likely to destroy his property when advised of
the forfeiture action, the government may obtain an ex parte restraining order." Id. Finally,
the government may prevent further illegal activity with proper search and arrest warrants. Id.
283. Id. at 1114.
284. 117 S.Ct. 1416 (1997).
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the common law requirement that police knock and announce their identity
before attempting forcible entry at a person's dwelling.28 5 Although the
Supreme Court explicitly stated in a prior decision that there does not have
to be an announcement before every entry, 286 Richards narrowed such an
assertion by emphatically holding that there would be no blanket exceptions
to the knock and announce requirement for felony drug investigations.
Prior to the Richards decision, "the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
concluded that police officers are never required to knock and announce
• •
their presence when executing
a search
warrant in a felony drug
289
investigation., 288 Exigent circumstances justifying a no-knock entry are
always present in felony drug cases because there is an "extremely high risk
of serious if not deadly injury to the police" and the potential for destruction
of narcotics evidence. 290 In addition, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
reasoned that the violation of privacy that occurs when officers with a search
warrant forcibly enter without first announcing their presence is minimal.29'
Conceding that the requirement to knock and announce may give way
under dangerous circumstances or where narcotics evidence is likely to be
destroyed, the Supreme Court noted this would not remove each court's
responsibility to make a reasonableness inquiry into a police decision not to
292
knock
and announce.
It isthe
thelegitimate
role of individual
to strike
the
appropriate
balance between
concerns courts
for police
officers'

285. Id. at 1421. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
286. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934.
287. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1417.
288. Id. at 1418. Police officers in Madison, Wisconsin obtained a warrant to search
Richards' hotel room for drugs and related paraphernalia. The search warrant was a
culmination of an investigation that had uncovered substantial evidence that the appellant was
one of several individuals dealing drugs out of hotel rooms in Madison. Police requested a
warrant that would have given advance authorization for a "no-knock" entry into the hotel
room, but the magistrate deleted this portion from the warrant. Officers knocked on the door,
Richards cracked it open and subsequently slammed the door closed, whereupon officers
forcibly entered discovering cocaine and money. Id. at 1418-19.
289. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin explained that the circumstances that necessitate
this exception are created by the realities of today's drug culture. State v. Richards, 549
N.W.2d 218, 221 (Wis. 1996), affd, 117 S.Ct. 1416 (1997). The blanket exception for
felony drug cases is reasonable because of the "violent and dangerous form of commerce and
the destruction of drugs." Richards, 117 S.Ct. at 1420 (quoting Oral Argument of Appellee
at 26).
290. Richards, 549 N.W.2d at 219.
291. Id. at 226.
292. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1421.
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safety while executing search warrants
293 and the individual privacy interests
that are invaded by no-knock entries.
The Supreme Court refused to create exceptions to the knock and
announce principle based on the culture surrounding a general category of
criminal behavior. 294 The first problem with an exception is it tends to
overgeneralize, particularly when assuming that all felony drug
investigations present an inherent danger to police officers or the evidence
sought. 95 A second difficulty with permitting any categorical exception to
the knock and announce principle is that the reasons for creating the
296
exception can easily be manipulated to apply to other situations.
If per se
exceptions were allowed for each category where potential danger existed,
the knock and announce element of the Fourth Amendment would be
rendered meaningless.2 97 The Supreme Court concluded that a no-knock
entry may be justified under unique circumstances where law enforcement
has a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence
would be dangerous or futile,2 98or that it would inhibit the effective
investigation of criminal activity.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
A.

Searches of PublicSchool Students

In a highly controversial case surrounding the strip searches of eightyear-old female students, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
the reasonableness of warrantless searches in public schools and the granting
of qualified immunity for school officials who conduct them. 299 In Jenkins v.
Talladega City Board of Education,300 the Eleventh Circuit held that the law

293. Id. at 1420.
294. Id. at 1421.
295. While drug investigations may cause substantial risks, not every felony drug
investigation will pose the same degree of uncertainty. For example, a search could be

conducted at a time when the only individuals present in a residence have no connection with
the drug activity and, thus, will be unlikely to threaten officers or destroy evidence.
Alternatively, the police could know that the drugs being searched for were of a type or in a
location that made them impossible to destroy. Id.
296. Id.
297. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1421.
298. Id.
299. Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997).
300. Id. at 821. One of Jenkins' and McKenzie's classmates informed their teacher that
seven dollars was missing from her purse. The teacher took the eight-year-old girls and
another male student into the hallway and questioned them about the money, at which time
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pertaining to applying the Fourth Amendment to the search of students at
school had not been solidly developed to place educators on notice that their
conduct was constitutionally impermissible. 30 1 Consequently, the three
school faculty members
who oversaw or conducted the search were granted
3 2
qualified immunity.
In the absence of "detailed guidance" by the United States Supreme
Court, 303 Jenkins found that the specific application of the factors established
to define the parameters of reasonable school searches was notably
deficient. 30 4 The broadly worded phrases of the United States Supreme
Court failed to address the most essential questions of "whether the search of
a boy or girl is more or less reasonable, and at what age.., and what
constitutes an infraction great enough to warrant a constitutionally
reasonable search or, conversely, minor enough such that a search of
property or person would be characterized as unreasonable., 30 5 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that "school officials cannot be required to construe
general legal formulations that have not once been applied to a specific set
of facts by any binding judicial authority., 30 6 It is apparent that the Supreme
Court did not intend to clearly establish how the Fourth Amendment right
they mutually accused the other of theft. The teacher instructed the students to remove their
shoes. When these efforts failed to reveal the alleged stolen money, a school counselor
ordered the girls into the bathroom to undress. Having again failed to recover the missing
money, the school principal had the girls escorted back to the restroom and required them to
once again remove their clothes in an effort to locate the seven dollars. Id. at 822-23.
301. Id. at 828.
302. Id. Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability unless they
violate laws or constitutional rights that a "reasonable" person would have been aware of.
Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 823.
303. Id. at 825. See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The Supreme Court
held that public school teachers and administrators may search students without a warrant if
two conditions are met. First, they possess reasonable suspicion that the search will result in
evidence that "the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school;"
and second, once initiated, the search is "not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex
of the student and the nature of the infraction." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. However, Jenkins
severely criticized the fact that there is no illustration, indication, or hint as to how the
enumerated factors might come into play when other concrete circumstances are faced by
school personnel. Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 825. This issue did not go unnoticed by several
justices who criticized the "reasonableness" test as ambiguous and that it would fail to provide
school officials with a systematic way to predict when their conduct might violate the law. Id.
at 827 n.7. Justice Stevens admonished the majority arguing that this standard would likely
"spawn increased litigation and greater uncertainty among teacher and administrators."
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring).
304. Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 825.
305. Id. at 826.
306. Id. at 827.
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would apply to the wide variety of school settings, justifying qualified
immunity for those school officials who could not have known that their
conduct violated the students' constitutional rights. 0 7
The most disturbing commentary from Jenkins involves the scope of the
search itself, which was not at issue in the decision. With respect to the
extent of the search, it is apparent that having the girls remove their clothing
was deemed reasonably related to the objective of uncovering the stolen
seven dollars.30 8 The stealing of this amount of money should not be
trivialized and was considered by school officials to be a matter of serious
concern. 30 9 Citing the fact that female teachers conducted the strip search on
the eight-year-old girls, the court denounced the fact that the searches were
excessively intrusive, comparing it to the "common experience" of teachers
who assist students of that age in the bathroom after an accidental wetting.310
Despite the age of the young girls and the successive encroachment on their
physical privacy, Jenkins noted that it would not be apparent to a reasonable
school official that the challenged searches "were 'excessively intrusive311in
light of the age and sex of the student[s] and the nature of the infraction.'
Undoubtedly, challenges to the intrusiveness of public school searches
will surface in upcoming survey periods. However, in light of Jenkins, it is
unclear what the Eleventh Circuit would find intrusive to a student's rightful
expectation of privacy. Considering a significant number of school searches
involve much greater dangers than the loss of seven dollars, strip searches
may soon become one of "common experience" in our public schools.
Several noteworthy decisions in Florida have followed the lead of the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, though with less widespread dissension,
by promoting the legal equivalent of "safety-first" in public schools. The
Florida district courts of appeal have tackled the continued debate over
random, suspicionless searches in public schools, and who is authorized to
administer them. In State v. .A.,
the Dade County School Board
employed an independent security company to conduct searches with metal
detecting wands at randomly chosen secondary schools in response to a
growing presence of firearms in public schools.
The court acknowledged
that "the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search
is 'reasonableness.' 31 4 Balancing the students' privacy interest against the
307. Id. at 828.
308. Id.at 827 n.5.
309. Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 827 n.5.

310. Id.
311. Id. See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
312. 679 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).

313. Id. at 318.
314. Id. at 319 (quoting Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995)).
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necessity of the search, the Third District Court of Appeal ruled that
authorizing random, suspicionless weapons searches of high school students
was reasonable and constitutional.3 5 With regard to a reasonable
expectation of privacy, "students within the school environment have31 6a
lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally.
In weighing the character of intrusion, the Third District Court of Appeal
found that a metal detector search, and the specific guidelines31required
to
7
carry it out, provide for a search that involves minimal intrusion.
Finally, the court cited the rising incidences of violence3 18 in Dade
County schools, denoting the nature and immediacy of the governmental
concern which is enough to warrant random suspicionless searches.3 1 9 The
unsettled question over who may conduct a school search upon a student
alleged to be carrying a weapon was answered by J.A.R. v. State.320 In
J.A.IK, a newly appointed assistant principal called upon the assistance of a
police officer assigned to the school to investigate a student who was
allegedly carrying a gun. The student was questioned and a pat-down search
was performed by the officer who discovered a firearm in the boy's
waistband.32 1
Under these circumstances, a school official or a police officer needs
only reasonable suspicion to conduct an inquiry in the nature of a Terry
stop. 322 In terms of the actual search, "[i]t would be foolhardy and
dangerous" for a teacher or administrator, untrained in firearms, to conduct a
weapons search without the presence of an officer. 323 Therefore, the Second
District Court of Appeal held that if a school official has a reasonable
suspicion that a student is in possession of a dangerous weapon, "that
official may request any police officer to perform the pat-down search for
weapons without fear that the involvement of the police will somehow
violate the student's Fourth Amendment rights or require probable cause for

315. Id. at 320.
316. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
317. J.A., 679 So. 2d at 320.
318. The court acknowledged that in recent years drug use and violent crimes in schools
has severely worsened. Id. The immediacy of a school board's concern for a student's safety,
and the safety of all school personnel is well justified. "The logical way to keep weapons out
of school is to let the students know that they may be searched for weapons and that
possession of weapons in a public high school is not permissible and will be seriously
sanctioned." Id. (emphasis omitted).
319. Id.
320. 689 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
321. Id. at 1243.
322. Id. at 1244. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
323. JAR., 689 So. 2d at 1244.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/4

40

Sale and Seitles: Criminal Procedure

Sale /Seitles

1997]

such a search. 3 24 Without distinguishing between public law enforcement
and officers who are employed by the school, the decision undoubtedly
raises constitutional concerns by authorizing any police officer to conduct a
search on reasonable suspicion alone. 325
However, the Third District Court of Appeal makes clear the distinction
between a school police officer and an outside police officer who conducts a
search. 326 A search conducted by a school police officer only requires
reasonable suspicion in order to legally support the search.327 On the other
hand, a search conducted by an outside police officer, who is employed by a
governmental entity unrelated
to the school district or its employees, usually
328
requires probable cause.
B.

InternationalBorderSearches

Persons may be stopped at an international border, where they and their
belongings may be searched without a warrant and even without any
suspicion of wrongdoing. 2 Although an airport with incoming international
flights has long been considered the functional equivalent of a border,
neither Florida courts nor the United States Supreme Court has directly
answered the question of whether an airport with departing flights also
constitutes a border. 33 Several federal circuit courts have held that an
airport with departing, as opposed to arriving, international flights meets the
border requirement. M

324. Id. (emphasis omitted).
325. See People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (111. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1692 (1996). Where school officials initiate the search, or police involvement is minimal,
most courts apply the reasonable suspicion test. The same is true in cases involving school
police or liaison officers acting on their own authority. However, where outside police
officers initiate a search, or where school officials act at the direction of law enforcement
agencies, the probable cause standard is usually applied. Id. See also M.J. v. State, 399 So.
2d 996, 998 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that where a law enforcement officer
directs, participates, or acquiesces in a search conducted by school officials, the officer must
have probable cause for that search).
326. State v. D.S., 685 So. 2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
327. Id. at 43.
328. Id.

329.

JOsHuA DREssLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

211 (1991).

330. See State v. Codner, 696 So. 2d 806, 807-08 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
331. See United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1296 n.3 (4th Cir. 1995). The "longstanding right of the sovereign" that underlies the traditional rationale for the border search
exception is implicated to a substantial degree where the international borders of the United
States are penetrated by large sums of undeclared currency departing this country. Id. at 1296.
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332

In State v. Codner, following the logic of the other federal circuit
courts, the Second District Court of Appeal held that a person "departing"
the country may be the subject of a "border search" for United States
currency and monetary instruments without the necessity of probable
cause. 333 In Codner, the appellant attempted to board a flight to Jamaica at
Tampa International Airport, but was detained by customs officials after a
search of his bag revealed he was carrying more than $11,000... in United
States currency. Personal papers, including a storage lease agreement, were
also confiscated from appellant's wallet during a search for additional
American currency.335
Notwithstanding the fact that an airport with departing flights may
constitute a border, the trial court found that the customs officers exceeded
the permissive scope of their warrantless search when they retrieved papers
from the appellant's wallet, looked them over, photocopied them, and
delivered the copies to the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office.336 The
Second District Court of Appeal dismissed this argument as one "without
merit." 337 The court determined the search of the appellant's wallet was a
routine border search as opposed to a nonroutine border
search. Moreover, there is no more logical location to look for currency
other than in someone's wallet. The fact that the wallet contained a storage
lease agreement, where the unit was later found to be full of contraband,
does not violate any principles of a routine border search.3 39
C.

Drug Testing

The controversial issue of drug testing for pubic employees reached the
United States Supreme Court during this survey year. The Supreme Court,
in Chandler v. Miller,340 held that the State of Georgia's requirement that

332. 696 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
333. Id. at 808.
334. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1986) states in part that "a person... shall file a report under
subsection (b) of this section when the person.... knowingly-(1)... is about to
transport,. . . monetary instruments of more than $10,000 at one time-(A) from a place in the
United States to or through a place outside the United States.. ." Id.
335. Codner, 696 So. 2d at 810.
336. Id. at 809.
337. Id. at 810.
338. Id. At least one court has specifically written that the search of a person's suitcase,
purse, wallet, and overcoat at the border is simply not "sufficiently intrusive to be considered
nonroutine." See United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1993).
339. Codner, 696 So. 2d at 810.
340. 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
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candidates for state office pass a drug test did not 341
fit within the category of
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.
The Georgia statute requires candidates for designated office to certify
that they have taken a urinalysis within thirty days prior to qualifying for
nomination or election, and that the test result be negative.3 42 It was
uncontested by the petitioners that this prerequisite for office, imposed by
Georgia law effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 343 Nevertheless, utilizing a balancing test, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court reasoning that
the drug testing program was not inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment
inasmuch as the statute served "special needs," interests other than the
ordinary needs of law enforcement.
The Supreme Court declared that to examine "special needs," concerns
other than crime detection, a specific inquiry must take place examining "the
competing private and public interests." 345 The petitioners contended that
this standard was faithfully satisfied because drug use is incompatible with
holding high state office, since it would systematically undermine the
function and purpose of the office, including jeopardizing law enforcement
antidrug efforts.
However, the Court found the petitioners' argument
failed to present any indication of a concrete danger demanding departure
from the Fourth Amendment's bar against search and seizure absent
individualized suspicion.3 47 Moreover, failing to establish the "special
needs" factor, petitioners offered no explanation why ordinary law
enforcement methods were not appropriate to apprehend drug-addicted state
officials, particularly in light of the public lifestyles of elected officials.348

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1298-99.
Id. at 1299.
Id.
Chandler,117 S.Ct. at 1297. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 671

(1995) (upholding a random drug testing program for high school students engaged in
interscholastic athletic competitions); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (sustaining a United States Customs Service program that made drug
tests a condition of promotion of transfer to positions directly involving drug interdiction or
requiring the employee to carry a firearm).
346. Chandler,117 S. Ct. at 1303.
347. Id. at 1300-01. In writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg noted that nothing in
the record revealed the hazards of drug abuse affecting state elected officials. Id. at 1303. In
fact, the counsel for the respondents directly acknowledged at oral argument that there was no
evidence of a drug problem in Georgia with representatives in state office. Id.

348. Id. at 1304.
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The Supreme Court clearly enunciated that if the risk to public safety is
"substantial and real," then "blanket suspicionless searches" may be justified
as "reasonable., 34 9 Nevertheless, a drug testing requirement where public
officials do not perform dangerous tasks, nor are immediately involved in
drug interdiction efforts, is precluded by the Fourth Amendment which
"shields society" from state efforts that "diminishes personal privacy" for
symbolic purposes. 350
VI. CONFESSIONS

A.

Equivocal References to Counsel

One of the most significant developments during this survey period
involves whether police officers are required to make clarifying statements
when a suspect makes an equivocal invocation of his Miranda rights after
having validly waived them. Prior to the recent decision by the United
States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States,351 a person undergoing
time his wish
indicate..in any manner and at any 352
custodial interrogation. could
.. .
However,
to remain silent, at which point the interrogation had to cease.
in light of the decision in Davis, a defendant must articulate his desire for
counsel with sufficient clarity so that a reasonable officer under the
circumstances would understand the statement to be one requesting an
attorney.353 In United States v. Mikell,35 4 the Eleventh Circuit further
narrowed the Davis decision by determining that an ambiguous or equivocal
statement by a suspect does not obligate an officer to clarify the suspect's
intent, and the interrogation may proceed. 355 The court in Mikell eliminated
the significance between a suspect's equivocal and unequivocal refusal to
answer questions, allowing officers to continue questioning until the suspect
clearly requests that the questioning cease. 356
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court decision, the majority of the courts
in Florida, until the end of this survey year, repeatedly adhered to the
principle that even an equivocal request to invoke the right to counsel asserts

349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1305.
Id.
512 U.S. 452 (1994).
Id. at 452. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.
102 F.3d 470 (1lth Cir. 1996).
Id. at 476. See Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1994).
Mikell, 102 F.3d at 477.
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the constitutional right to counsel.35 7 If questioning did358 continue, it was
allowed only to "clarify" any assertion made by a suspect.
Recently, in State v. Owen,359 the Supreme Court of Florida held that in
light of the decision in Davis, the duty to clarify a suspect's intent upon an
equivocal invocation of counsel is no longer good law.360 This same rule
should apply to a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal references to the right to
cut off questioning as to the right to counsel. 361 As affirmed by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals this year, "a suspect must articulate his desire to
end questioning with sufficient clarity so that a reasonable police officer
would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain
silent., 362 Consequently, it is indisputable that Florida's Constitution no
longer places greater restrictions on law enforcement than those mandated
under3 federal
law when a suspect makes an equivocal statement to remain
63
silent.
The decision in Owen was based on the practical dilemma that requires
questioning to cease if a suspect makes a statement that might be a request
for an attorney. Without mentioning the pragmatic benefits of such a
clarifying policy, the court noted the result is a judgment call for law
enforcement with the threat of suppression if they guess
wrong. 364 Therefore, to force a police officer to clarify whether an equivocal
statement is an assertion of a person's
Miranda rights,,365'
"places too great an
,
impediment upon society's interest in thwarting crime.

357. The Supreme Court of Florida remarked that to be admissible, confessions must
satisfy both the state and federal constitutions. Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 962 (Fla.
1992). If a suspect indicates in any manner that he does not want to be interrogated,

questioning must not begin, or, if it has already begun, must immediately stop. Id. at 966. See
Weber v. State, 691 So. 2d 55, 55-56 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that response by
defendant that "he could not afford an attorney" invoked the defendant's right to counsel
requiring officers to clarify his assertion before interrogation could continue); Almeida v.
State, 687 So. 2d 37, 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that defendant who asked
what was the purpose of having an attorney made an equivocal invocation of his right to
counsel). But see State v. Moya, 684 So. 2d 279, 280-81 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(ruling that defendant who proceeded with questioning after stating that he did not know if he
wanted to talk did not violate Mirandanor the Florida Constitution).
358. See Weber, 691 So. 2d at 56.
359. 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997).
360. Id. at 718.
361. Id.
362. United States v. Mikell, 102 F.3d 470, 476 (11th Cir. 1996).
363. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 720.
364. Id. at 719.
365. Id.
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A number of justices challenged whether the majority's decision
reflects the best interests of the diverse community for which it
speaks. Justice Shaw, in his concurring opinion, emphasized that the new
"clearly invoke" standard must take into account the population of Florida,
which is home to a large number of immigrants. 366 Many Floridians have
little formal schooling or speak minimal English and "have emigrated from
societies where the rules governing citizen/police encounters are vastly
different.
,367 Justice Shaw found it simply unrealistic to expect every
person in the State of Florida to invoke his or her constitutional rights with
equal precision; therefore, courts should use a "reasonable person" standard
when determining whether a person clearly invoked the right to terminate
questioning.368
Chief Justice Kogan, in his dissenting opinion, asserted that "the
'clarification' approach offers the best balance between effective law
enforcement and the rights of the accused. 3 69 Chief Justice Kogan agreed
with Justice Shaw's assessment that requiring an officer to determine
whether a suspect has "clearly" invoked his or her Miranda rights without
compelling further "questioning is not an easy task in light of [Florida's]
unique demographic and geographic makeup., 370 As a result of the
sufficient language and cultural barriers that faces many residents of Florida,
"only the 'clarification"' approach will adequately protect the rights of all
suspects.., while..,
maintaining
an
effective
system
of
law
3 71
enforcement.
B.

Invoking Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel Priorto Interrogation

The recent division in the Florida courtS372 over when a person in
custody effectively invokes his or her Fifth Amendment right to counsel has

366. Id. at 721 (Shaw, J., concurring).
367. Id. at 722.
368. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 722.
369. Id. at 723 (Kogan, C.J., dissenting).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 724.
372. See Cullen v. State, 687 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) decision
approved, 699 So. 2d 1009 (filing a notice with public defender to invoke right to counsel was
ineffective and the incriminating statements defendant made later to the police were
admissible). But see Fason v. State, 674 So. 2d 916, 917 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(defendants signing of notification of exercise of rights form prevented the use of defendant's
incriminating statements obtained during police-initiated interrogation while defendant was in
custody).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/4

46

Sale and Seitles: Criminal Procedure

1997]

Sale ISeitles

been answered by the Supreme Court of Florida in a 4-3 decision. 373 In
Sapp v. State,374 the court affirmed the decision of the First District Court of
Appeal and held that a suspect may not invoke
his right to counsel for
375
custodial interrogation before it is imminent.
Although there are no Supreme Court decisions addressing whether an
individual may effectively invoke the Fifth Amendment right to counsel
prior to custodial interrogation, 376 the Supreme Court noted they have never

held that a person can invoke his Mirandarights "anticipatorily, in a context

3 77 Even though an asserted Miranda
other than 'custodial interrogation.0'
right to counsel is effective to future custodial interrogation, and may be

waived only if the same individual reinitiates conduct with police, it does not
necessarily mean
378 that it may be initiated outside the context of custodial
interrogation.
The underlying premise of Mirandawas to protect the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, not when a suspect is taken into
custody, but rather where a suspect is subjected to interrogation.37 9 Sapp
hypothesizes that even if a rule allowed one to invoke the right to counsel

373. The question, as originally certified asked:
WHETHER AN ACCUSED IN CUSTODY EFFECTIVELY INVOKES HIS
[OR HER] FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER
[MIRANDA v. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
(1966),] WHEN, EVEN THOUGH INTERROGATION IS NOT
IMMINENT, HE [OR SHE] SIGNS A CLAIM OF RIGHTS FORM AT OR
SHORTLY
BEFORE
A
FIRST
APPEARANCE
HEARING,
SPECIFICALLY CLAIMING A FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL?
Sapp v. State, 690 So. 2d 581, 583 (Fla. 1997).
374. Id. at 581.
375. Id. at 586. In Sapp, the petitioner was arrested for robbery. He was advised of his
Miranda rights, waived them, and agreed to speak to the police. Subsequently, Sapp was
brought to a holding cell where he was advised by an attorney from the public defender's
office to sign a copy of a "claim of rights form," with which he complied. Id. at 583. A week
later, while Sapp remained in jail, an officer initiated an interrogation with him about another
robbery and murder. Before being questioned, Sapp was advised of his Miranda rights, and
he waived them in writing without requesting an attorney. The trial court denied the motion to
suppress the statements and Sapp was convicted of attempted armed robbery and first degree
felony murder. Id.
376. "Clearly, if Sapp had invoked his Miranda right to counsel during custodial
interrogation on the unrelated robbery charge, police would not have been permitted to
approach him later for questioning on that robbery and murder charge." Sapp, 690 So. 2d at
584 n.5.
377. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991).
378. Id. at 182 n.3.
379. Sapp, 690 So. 2d at 585.
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before interrogation was imminent, it would not provide protection against
involuntary confessions and would actually hamper the ability of police to
obtain voluntary confessions. 380 In essence, requiring a person to invoke the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel either during custodial interrogation or
when it is imminent represents a fair "balance between protection.., from
police coercion... and the State's need to conduct criminal
investigations."3' 81
Acknowledging the harsh blow to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
Justice Anstead, along with three other justices in their dissenting opinion,
expressed his concern that the constitutional rights an accused is informed of
when arrested may not be invoked in writing in an open court. 382 Under the
majority's perplexing logic, "a written directive executed upon the advice of
counsel may be ignored by police even though an uncounseled oral assertion
must be scrupulously honored. 383 In regard to "imminent" interrogation, the
dissent noted that a defendant in jail, who has already been interrogated by
police, categorically establishes the "reasonableness" of a defendant's
expectation of further interrogation. 384 The dissent concluded that in yet
another decision related to confessions, the Supreme Court of Florida had
once again undermined a fundamental principle set forth in Miranda,
applying justice fairly among every segment of the population.38 5
C.

The FunctionalEquivalent ofInterrogation

The question of whether police conduct is the functional equivalent of
interrogation
386 was decided by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. In Glover
v. State, the court found police conduct toward appellant Glover to be

380. Id. at 586.
381. Id.
382. Id. (Anstead, J., dissenting).
383. Id. at 587.
384. Sapp, 690 So. 2d at 589.
385. Id. at 587. "If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel
before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on
the basis that the individual... cannot afford [an attorney]." Id. "The need for counsel in
order to protect the privilege [against self incrimination] exists for the indigent as well as the
affluent." Id. This clearly takes advantage of those who are unable to retain counsel by
discounting their prior Fifth Amendment assertion not to be interrogated without an attorney.
Id. at 588. See State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997). The "threshold standard of clarity"
approach to confessions places a hurdle in front of those individuals who are most likely to
have difficulty surmounting that hurdle and successfully invoking their rights. Sapp, 690 So.
2d at 588 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
386. 677 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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"tantamount to custodial interrogation." 87 Glover was arrested without the
benefit of Miranda warnings and was placed in an interrogation room for
over an hour and a half. Although he repeatedly asked why he had been
arrested, the attending police officers refused to respond. Even as appellant
became increasingly agitated, law enforcement officials would not inform
him of the allegations that led to his arrest. As time progressed, Glover
began speaking without any initiation byo the officers, ultimately making
statements that served to incriminate him.ms
Under Miranda,"interrogation" refers not only to express questioning,
but to those words or actions on the part of the police that the officers should
recognize are "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from a
suspect." 38 9 The rationale for this broader definition is to keep intact the
"safeguards against self-incrimination established by Miranda [which
logically] apply to interrogation initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody. 390 "'Interrogation' . . . must reflect39 1a
measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.
As a result, the Glover court ruled that the conduct of the police officers
toward the appellant was "unduly protracted392and evocative" such that it
became equivalent to a custodial interrogation.
D.

Use of Pre-MirandaSilence for Impeachment Purposes

In an important decision likely to be ultimately decided by the Supreme
Court of Florida, 393 Hoggins v. State3 94 discussed whether pre-Miranda

387. Id. at 376.
388. Id. at 375.
389. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
390. Glover, 677 So. 2d at 376.
391. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300.
392. Glover, 677 So. 2d at 376. See State v. Brown, 592 So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1991).
393. Because of the discrepancy in the decisions of several Florida district courts of
appeal, the court in Hoggins v. State, 689 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997), rev.
granted,697 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1997), certified the following question to the Supreme Court of
Florida:
DOES FLORIDA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 9, PREVENT
THE IMPEACHMENT OF A TESTIFYING DEFENDANT WITH THE
DISCLOSURE OF A DEFENDANT'S PRE-MIRANDA SILENCE WHILE
IN CUSTODY?

Id. at 387.
394. 689 So. 2d. at 383. This case arises from the armed robbery of a convenience
store. Hoggins was found upstairs in his mother's apartment with a cash drawer and a cigar
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silence is permissible for impeachment purposes. 395 In direct opposition to
the ruling by the Third District Court of Appeal,396 the Fourth District Court
of Appeal held that the use of custodial pre-Miranda silence for
impeachment purposes violates
the due process protections guaranteed by
397
the Florida Constitution.
On the federal level, the United States Constitution does not prohibit
the use, for impeachment purposes, of a defendant's silence even after arrest
if no Miranda warnings have been given.398 However, the Supreme Court
has left open the possibility that states could formulate their own evidentiary
rules defining when silence is viewed as more probative than
prejudicial. 399 As a result, many states have used their own evidentiary
analysis to condemn the use of pre-Mirandasilence impeachment. 4 00 Other
states have relied on their state constitutional provisions to do so. 40 ' Still
other states have followed the Supreme Court and approved the use of preMirandasilence for impeachment purposes.40 2
The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized the right of state
constitutions to place more rigorous restraints on governmental conduct than
the United States Constitution imposes. In fact, the actual right to remain
silent is entitled to more protection under the Florida Constitution than the

box whereupon he was handcuffed, identified by one of the victims, and arrested. However,
he was not read his Miranda rights until he was placed in the patrol car. Hoggins testified
how he retrieved the items, but upon cross-examination was questioned as to why he never
told police his story when they came to the apartment the night of the robbery. An objection
to this impeachment was overruled. Id. at 384.
395. Id. at 384 n.2.
396. See Rodriguez v. State, 619 So. 2d 1031, 1032 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that the impeachment of defendant's credibility with his pre-Miranda silence is
proper, validating the prosecutor's extensive commentary on the defendant's failure to give an
explanation at the scene of the robbery).
397. Hoggins,689 So. 2d at 386.
398. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
399. Id. at 607.
400. Some states make an evidentiary determination on a case by case basis. See People
v. DeGeorge, 541 N.E.2d 11 (N.Y. 1989); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1987).
Others have ruled that impeachment as to custodial pre-Mirandasilence is inadmissible based
on their rules of evidence. See Mallory v. State, 409 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. 1991). In addition,
there are states that have precluded impeachment as to pre-Miranda silence on both
evidentiary and constitutional grounds. See Coleman v. State, 895 P.2d 653 (Nev. 1995).
401. See Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 389 (Wyo. 1995); State v. Davis, 686 P.2d
1143, 1145 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
402. State v. Finley, 915 P.2d 208, 218 (Mont. 1996); State v. Sorenson, 421 N.W.2d
77, 79 (Wis. 1988).
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United States Constitution. 40 3 Furthermore, by prohibiting impeachment of a
testifying defendant with custodial silence, all defendants are treated the
same regardless of when Miranda warnings are administered. 40 4 The
Hoggins court also appropriately expressed its concern that a rule allowing
impeachment as to pre-Mirandasilence, but not as to post-Mirandasilence,
may result in police unnecessarily postponing the giving of the warnings, so
that silence can be effectively used as impeachment if the defendant
testifies. °5
E.

Voluntary Confessions

It is well established that where two defendants are tried together, the
admission of the codefendant's confession without the other defendant
taking the stand violates defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment
4 °7 the Eleventh Circuit
Confrontation Clause. 40 6 In UnitedStates v. Chirinos,
Court of Appeals utilized an exception in upholding the admission of a
codefendant's confession against three other appellants in the case. 408 The
exception to the Confrontation Clause rule entitles the admission of a
nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction if
the court revises the confession to "eliminate any reference to the
defendant." 409 However, during closing argument in the Chirinos trial, the
prosecutor asked the jury to carefully consider the voluntary confessions of
two codefendants and the testimony of one of the appellants.
The Eleventh Circuit found the prosecutorial comments highly
suggestive and at the very least, implied the involvement of the appellants.

403. See Lee v. State, 422 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982). See also
Willinsky v. State, 360 So. 2d 760, 762 (Fla. 1978) (concluding that impeachment by
disclosure of the legitimate exercise of the right to silence is a denial of due process regardless
at what stage the accused was silent so long as it is protected at that stage); Webb v. State, 347
So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
404. Hoggins v. State, 689 So. 2d 383, 386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
405. Id. at 386.
406. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987).
407. 112 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir. 1997). The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms
("ATF") conducted a sting operation against five members of the Vargas group who planned
to steal 300 kilograms of cocaine from an arriving shipment. Id. at 1093. The men in the
group were arrested at the Opa Locka West airstrip where two of the men approached the
fictitious bags of cocaine located on the runway. Upon arrest, two of the men waived their
Miranda rights and told the ATF of their plan to steal the cocaine. Id. at 1093-94.
408. Id. at 1100.

409. Id.
410. Chirinos, 112 F.3d at 1100.
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Nevertheless, the court determined that the prosecutor did not argue to the
jury that it could consider the post-arrest statements of two of the members
of the Vargas group, since it merely served the purpose of corroborating the
appellant's testimony.4 1' In an apparent stretch of logic, based on the
principle that incriminating evidence such as post-arrest confessions differs
in a practical effect from evidence requiring linkage, the codefendant's
statements linked with the testimony of the appellant did not constitute
improper argument. 412
Another case in which the appellant challenged the admission of a
codefendant's confession in violation of the Confrontation Clause reached a
similar conclusion. In Farinav. State,413 the Supreme Court of Florida held
that a codefendant's taped conversations had sufficient "indicia of
reliability" and were properly admitted.4 14
When a statement against one's own interest also incriminates another
criminal defendant and is admitted during their joint trial such statements are
"presumptively suspect" and must be subjected to the scrutiny of crossexamination. 4 F5 Even if such statements are properly admitted against the
hearsay exception, 416 they are likely to raise problems with the Confrontation
Clause which does not permit a nontestifying codefendant's confession to
incriminate a defendant.
However, this does not mean that such statements are always
inadmissible. The presumption of unreliability may be rebuffed where there
is a showing of trustworthiness that the statements have an "indicia of
reliability.",4 r Farinadetermined that since the recorded statements between
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. 679 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1996).
414. Id.at 1157.
415. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986).
416. Section 90.804(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes creates an exception to the hearsay
rule for statements against interest if that person is unavailable to testify. The statements must
meet the following criteria:
A statement which, at the time of its making, was so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest or tended to subject the declarant
to liability or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, so
that a person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement
unless he or she believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is
inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of
the statement.
FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(c) (1995).
417. See Cruz v.New York,481 U.S. 186, 191-92. (1987).
418. Id.at 193-94.
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the two brothers took place in the back seat of a police car, and each was
present to confront the other throughout the conversations detailing the
crime, the taped conversations were reliable and had4 1a9 sufficient "indicia of
reliability" to be admissible against petitioner Farina.
In Davis v. State,42 the Supreme Court of Florida confronted the issue
of whether successive Miranda warnings are a prerequisite for persons in
custody who reinitiate contact with law enforcement officials.421 While in a
holding cell, Davis had requested to be allowed to contact his mother to
retain an attorney for him. Subsequent to his request but before his mother
was contacted, Davis was approached by an officer who expressed
disappointment in him. Davis, who still had not been given Miranda
warnings, then voluntarily confessed to murdering an eleven-year-old girl
and thereafter gave a taped interview during which he was fully informed of
his Mirandarights. One week later, without the advice of counsel or formal
Miranda warnings, Davis gave a second taped confession to the
police.422 The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that Davis' untaped
confession should have been suppressed. 423 However, each of Davis' taped
confessions, including the one given a week later without a fresh set of
Mirandawarnings, were deemed admissible and admitted without error.424
Dealing a serious blow to the proponents of Miranda, Davis moved
away from its mechanical application and set forth a contemporary test for
admissibility of statements made in subsequent or successive custodial
interrogations: "Whether the statements were given voluntarily. '425 The
court noted that such an inquiry must consider the totality of the
circumstances. 426 The Davis court, in upholding the admissibility of both
427
emphatically rejected the notion that a complete
taped confessions,
readvisement of Miranda warnings is necessary each time an accused
undergoes additional custodial interrogation.42 8 The Supreme Court of
Florida concluded that the fact that Davis initiated the contact that led to his

419. Farinav. State, 679 So. 2d 1151, 1157 (Fla. 1996).
420. 698 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1997).
421. Id. at 1189.
422. Id. at 1186.
423. Id. at 1189.
424. Id.
425. Davis, 698 So. 2d at 1189.
426. Id.
427. The untaped confession to the police officer was inadmissible because no formal
Miranda warnings were given. The confession was found to be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt and did not affect the defendants conviction for murder. Id.
428. Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 1997

53

Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 4

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 22:93

second taped confession and that he was apprised of his right to counsel
satisfied the underlying concerns of Miranda.
In the well-publicized case of Rolling v. State,430 involving the murder
of five Florida college students, the court scrutinized the role of law
enforcement officers in determining whether a confession was obtained in
violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 43' The court
acknowledged that statements "deliberately elicited" from a defendant after
the right to counsel has been invoked and in the absence of a valid waiver
are inadmissible.432 Nevertheless, the court was not willing to exclude
incriminatory statements by the defendant merely because the statements
were made after judicial proceedings had been initiated.433 "Rather, law
enforcement officials must
434do something that infringes upon the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right.,
The Supreme Court of Florida's standard for such a determination rests
on whether the confessions were obtained through the active or passive
efforts of law enforcement.435 In essence, if a defendant's statement has not
been a product of a strategy "deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating
statement" then the person's right to counsel has not been violated.436
In Meyers v. State,437 the Supreme Court of Florida answered questions
regarding the admissibility of a voluntary
- .438 confession where circumstantial
evidence is the basis for a conviction.
Meyers, who voluntarily made
statements to inmates with whom he was incarcerated, established the details
439
of his attempted sexual battery and murder of a fourteen-year-old girl.
Although the victim's body was never recovered, Meyers had physical
injuries consistent with a violent confrontation and bore marks on his side
that resembled the shoes the victim was wearing at the time she disappeared.

429. Id.
430. 695 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1997).
431. Id. at 289-92.
432. Id. at 290. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
433. Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 290.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 291. Rolling made statements to police officials through another inmate.
Each contact with the authorities was actively made by either the appellant or his fellow
inmate. Therefore, statements to a fellow inmate and to investigators were not the result of
Sixth Amendment violations. Id. See Sikes v. State, 313 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (holding that voluntary statements to prison authorities by an incarcerated
defendant are not subject to the Massiah rule).
436. Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 291.
437. No. 85617, 1997 WL 109219 (Fla. Mar. 13, 1997).
438. Id. at *1-2.
439. Id. at *1.
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In order to prove corpus delicti in a homicide case, the state must establish:
"(1) the fact of death; (2) the criminal agency of another person as the cause
thereof; and (3) the identity of the deceased person." 40 To admit a
defendant's confessions, corpus delicti may be proved either by direct or
circumstantial evidence that tends to show that a crime 441
was committed,
however, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not mandatory.
As a result of these statements, the sufficient circumstantial evidence
presented by the State proved the corpus delicti of the homicide and
permitted the admission of Meyer's confessions to former cellmates 42 The
Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the circumstantial evidence introduced
by the State was sufficient to prove corpus
delicti such that defendant's
443
inculpatory statements were admissible.
XII. CONCLUSION

During the survey period, the United States Supreme Court, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and several Florida courts have
demonstrated their attempt to fairly balance the competing interests between
the interests of law enforcement and an individual's concern for
privacy. Without drawing sweeping conclusions, and recognizing the
numerous exceptions, these courts have progressed toward providing greater
authority to law enforcement officials. The path in this direction does not
appear to be shifting and will likely result in future decisions in which the
safeguarding of citizens' rights is subordinated to enhance the powers of
those who serve to protect us.

440. Id.
441. Id. at *2.
442. Meyers, 1997 WL 109219, at *3.
443. Id. at *2. The phrase "corpus delicti ' refers to proof independent of a confession
that the crime charged was in fact committed. See Bassett v. State, 449 So. 2d 803, 807 (Fla.
1984). Since the girl's body was never found, the court relied heavily on the confession
Meyers made to a cellmate about the murder. According to the cellmate's testimony, the
victim apparently violently resisted the sexual advances of the appellant. Eventually, Meyers
killed the girl by cutting her throat and disposed of the body in the woods, piling chunks of
concrete on top of her body so she could not be found. Meyers, 1997 WL 109219, at *2.
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